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Short-run  employment  functions:  their evolution 
failure  and  replacement? 
Introduction: 
In  the  post-war  period,  macro-economic  models  in  the 
major  industrial countries  have  included  a  short-term  employ-
ment  function.  It is  a  key  stage  in  the  analysis  of  the 
pressure  of  demand  in  the  labour market,  a  major  policy target 
within  full  employment,  anti-inflation  and  balance  of  payments 
policy  packageso  The  purpose  of  this  paper is  to  trace their 
evolution,  to  point  to.their failure  (both  theoretical·and 
empirical)  and  to  suggest  the  way  that  must  be  fallowed  to 
replace  this  part  of  the  conventional  model  structure. 
The  first  part of  the  paper  traces  the  evolution  of  the 
short-run  employment  function  in  terms  of its empirical 
behaviour.  No  attempt  is made  to  compete  with  or collate 
existing  estimates  - these  are  already  too  well  documented1  -
but  rather  to  highl~ght  t~e response  of  macro-modellers  to .. 
instability in  the  performance  of vaiious  specifications. 
The  main  conclusion  of  this  section is that most  amendments 
have  been  ad  hoc  and  that  the  theoretical basis  of  the  con-
ventional  form,  and  even  that  of  the  most  promising  recent 
development,  is over fifteen  years  old. 
In  the  second  part of  the  paper,  we  suggest  a  set of 
headings  to  act  as  an  outline for  a  framework  of analysis, 
1.  See,  for  example,  Henry  (1979)e - 2  -
drawing  on  Tarling  (1979b),  and  use  this  to  explain  the  failure 
of  the  conventional  model.  The  third  part is  an  attempt  to 
construct  a  theory  of  employment  demand  within  the  context  of 
a  structural model  of  the  labour market  which  takes  cognisance 
of  the  theories  of labour  m~rke~ ~egmentation and  draws  on 
them  to  show  the  endogeneity of  processes  which  rules  out 
partial analysis  presumed  by  previous  theoretical work. 
It is as  well  to  make  clear the  methodology  of  the  paper 
at  the  outset.  In  contrast to  conventional  academic  procedure, 
no  attempt  is made  to  discriminate  between  alternative  hypotheses 
or to  suggest discriminatory tests.  The  paper sets out  to 
tackle  a  pa~ticular problem  - to  consider  the  proposition  that 
the  labour  market  is competitive  - by 'drawing  on  existing  ideas 
and  the  success  or failure  of  the  attempt  is to  be  judged  by 
its coherence  and  general applicability,  rather  than  specific 
comparisons  of  sections  of  the  argument. 
The  argument  draws  heavily  on 'existing studies  of  labour 
market  behaviour,  particularly at the  macro-economic  level  and 
on  the  subject of  low  pay.  The  analysis  reveals  certain  rather 
important  gaps,  such  as  the  role of 1nstitutional organisation 
and  its flexibility in  relation  to  product  market  changes. 
Thus  one  outcome  of  the  work  is to  suggest  areas  where  research 
is  needed.  Another  result of  the  analysis  is to  indicate  to 
what  extent  dynamic  relationships  in  the  labour market  can  be 
captured  in specifications of  behaviour  which  can  be  tested 
using  available data.  This  latter objective is only  partially 
achieved  since  the  construction  of  a  structural model  of  the 
labour  market still leaves  the  question  of  the  tractability 
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of  th~  mod~l and  the  derivation  of  reduced  forms  compatible· 
with  existing  data  availability  and  capable  of discriminating 
between  hypotheses&  An  attempt  is  made  to  deal  with  this in 
the  final  sections  of  the  paper. 
The  purpose  of  the  pe;per  th.en  J.s  to  present  a  framework 
of  analysis  for  laLHJur  m:...u:ket  issues  and  its contribution lies 
in  integrating  various  aspects  of  labour  market  behaviour.  The 
conclusion  is that  labour  markets  are  not  in  general  competitive 
in  the  neo-classical sense  but  bear  mora  characteristics of  a 
Marxian  labour  market.  The  main  forces  of  competition  are 
fElt  in  the  pxoduct  market  dnd  it is  behaviour  in  this market, 
and  in response  to  the  press~res in  this  market,  which ·integrates 
the  economic,  sociological  and  institutional aspects  of  the 
.. labour  market. 
The  pDp8r  ccncludes  with  a  summary  of  the  argument  and  a 
mathemati~al reprbscntation  of  tha  model  outlined. - 4  -
A.  The  evolution  of conventional  models 
1.  The  starting point: 
There  are  numerous  ·exa'mple's 'in  the  empirical literature 
of unsuccessful attempts at estimating  production  functions 
from  time  series data.  Despite  the  relative full  employment 
of  the  1950s  and  1960s,  both  in  the  UK  and  the  US,  it was 
accepted  that  one  of  the difficulties was  a  failure  to  cope 
with  cyclical variability and  the  existence  of short-run 
derived  demand  functions  for  inputs.  This  led  to  estimation, 
particular!¥ by  macro-modellers  during  the  1950s  and  early 
1960s,  of specifications of ·the  derived  demand  for  labour 
based  on  inverting the  production  f~nction: 
E =  f(t,  Q,  E_1 ) 
where  t  =time  (a  shift for capital and  technical progress), 
Q =  output  and  E  =·employment:  the  lagged  term  is intended 
to  capture disequilibrium  .. behaviour. 
~ 
But  the  theoretical basis  of the  equilibrium analysis 
was  inadequate.  Brechling  (1965)  provided  one  which  was 
extensively developed  by  Ball  and  St.  Cyr  (1966).  The  key 
to  the  breakthrough  is that,  al~hough the  market  was  atomistic 
so  that  a  theory  could  be  set  up  for  a  representative  firm, 
the  wag~ cost  per man  hour  was  not  exogenous  and  hence  one 
could  achieve  a  short-period  cost minimising  solution.  In 
simple  terms,  each  firm  operated  with  a  production  function: 
I 
~  . 
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where  E*  =  desired  employment  and  h  =  hours  worked 
where  Wh  =effective wage  per  hour  and  Ft =fixed costs. 
Because  productive  hours  worked  could  be  less  than  paid  hours 
for  a  normal  week  and  because  an  overtime  premium  was  paid, 
it was  asserted  that  wage  cost  per productive hwr  now  fell 
until hours  worked  reached  the  normal  week  and  then  increased 
as  overtime  increased.  Thus,  Wh  could  be  written  approximately 
as 
a  - bh  +  ch2 
By  specifying  the shift term  as  f{t)  =  Aept  and  minimising  the 
cost  equation  with  respect  to  desired  employment,  it could·. 
be  shown  that 
To  convert this  expression  to  one  for actual  employment, 
Brechling  and  Ball  and  St.  Cyr  use  the  simple  partial adjust-
ment  model: 
0  <  >.  ~  1. 
Most  of  the  models  estimated  around  this  time  were  fitted 
to  data  for  manufacturing  industry.  Macro-modellers  needed 
an  equation  for  the  whole  economy  and  most  adopted  the  above - 6  -
formulation.  One  exception,  which  became  a  central  equation 
in  the  Treasury ·model  in  the  1960s,  was  that  estimated  by 
Godley  and  Shepherd  (1964).  This  model  postulated  an 
asymmetric  adjustment  process: 
E  'E  V  ( Et*  )  t  - t-1  =  0  - Et-1 
=  oc(  +  ~  (Et*- Et-1) 
with  o(  '7  0  and  ~  < '6,  Godley  and  Shepherd  employed  an 
iterative technique;  maximum  likelihood  estimates,  together 
with  a  number  of  amendments  to  the specification1,  were 
provided  by  Pesaran  (1973).· 
Thus  the  basic  model  which  appeared  in  the  early 1960s 
had  three  components:  a)  a  derived  demand  equation  for desired 
labour input  (given  by  the  production function),  b)  a  behavioural 
relationship .from  which  to  infer the  balance  of  input  between 
employees  and  average  hours  (the  .. cost  ~~uation and  its~minimis­
ation),  and  c)  a  simple  partial adjustment  mechanism.  But,  in 
the late 1960s,  this accepted,  albeit  ve~y simple,  specification 
beg~n to  show  sigri~ of  fnstabil~ty! firstly yielding  poo~ 
predictions  and  then  (as  time  passed)  parameter estimates  which 
varied  according  to  the data  used. 
2.  Initial reactions  to  instability: 
The  main  characteristic of the  post-war  peri6d  to  the  mid 
1960s  was  that it was  regarded  by  most  economists  in  the  UK 
1.  The  model  was  specified in  terms  of  logarithms  and  K put 
equal to  «~/(¥- ~)  to  ensure continuity  • 
.  . 
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as  a  period  of  'full employment'.  Not  surprisingly,  therefore, 
the first  reaction~. were  to  appeal  to  supply constraints. 
Attempts  were  made  to  introduce  the  capital stock  explicitly 
or to  appeal  to  accelerations  in  trend  productivity;  the  rapid 
upswing  of 1963/4  was  a  prominent date for  the  break  in  trend. 
But  these  did  not  provide  more  stable relationships. 
The  difficulty was  that  new  observations  were  having  a 
substantial impact  on  parameter estimates.  So  the  next  element 
to  receive attention  was  the  adjustment  p·rocess.  Instead  of 
the  simple  mechanism,  equations  were  estimated  using  freely-
estimated  lag  structures,  rational lags  and  Almon  lags,  all 
to  very.litt+e avail;  a~though these results  tended  all-to 
point  toward  some  acceleration in the  adjustment  process. 
But  now  people  were  becoming  awa~e of the  deflationary 
impact  of  the July  1966  measures  and  monetarism  was  gaining 
ground  in  the  UK.  Following  analyses  of  the  rise in  unemploy-
ment  and  the shift in  the  unemployment-vacancy  relationship, 
reductions  in labour hoarding  (see  Taylor  (1976))  and  voluntary 
reductions  in  the  supply of labour  (see  for ·example  Foster 
(1974))  were  seen  as  indications  of  a~change in  labour market 
behaviour,  the  particular impact  of which  had  been  to  externalize 
the  supply of labour  to  individual firms. 
At  about  the  same  time,  the  Labour  Government's  incomes 
policy  broke  down  (1969)  and  inflation accelerated.  This 
brought  out  a  rash  of analyses  including  the  real wage  and 
relative factor  prices.  Some  of the  analyses  did  not  incorporate 
these  variables directly but  estimated  accelerations  in 
productivity and  explained  these  by  wage  variables.  These 
i_' - 8  -
analyses,·  together with  those  relating to  changed  labour market 
behaviour,  are  summarised  in  H~nstein and  Tarling  {1976). 
This  paper  used  data  which  included  the  massive  upswing 
during  1972/73.  Its findings  were  similar to those  of  many 
other analyses  around  at the  time;  showing  that  the  evidence 
was  consistent with  reduced  labour  hoarding  {the  reductions 
being  over short  periods,  generally  downswings)  and  perhaps 
an  associated  increase  both  in  the  speed  of adjustment  and 
the  long-run elasticity of  employment  to  output. 
3.  In  the  deeper  recession  since  1914: 
There  are  some  facts  which  have  oecome  increasingly 
apparent  and  have  an  important  bearing  on  recent  developments. 
Firstly,  changes  in  the  number  of  employees  have  been  very 
small  given  the  changes  in output,  even  over  long  periods, 
. J 
and  there  has  been  considerably  more·~ariation in  short-time 
working  and  average  overtime.  Taken  together,  these  pieces 
of  evidence  suggest  a  sluggish  response  of labour  input  to 
changes  in output.  Partly because  of  ~his,  but  not  solely so, 
previous  relationships  (generally  taken  to  mean  estimated  on 
data  from  about  1955  to  1973  or 4)  produce  residuals  since 
1974  consistent with  the  view  that the  trend  growth  of 
productivity has  slowed  down. 
What  are  the  explanations  being  put  forward?  Real  wage 
changes  and  simple  productivity trend  changes  are inherited 
from  the  past;  institutional factors  have  become  relevant with 
the  introduction of  the  Temporary  Employment  Subsidy  and  the 
!,' 
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Employment  Protection  Legislation;  and  a  more  promising  area 
of analysis,  developing  recursive  models  for  employment  and 
hours  worked  (see  Peterson  (1978)).  This  latter approach  to 
the  problem  seeks  to  give  greater empirical support  to  the 
cost-minimising  behaviour· fi~st suggested  by  Brechling.  The 
basic  hypothesis  remains  the original  one~ that is,  that 
variations  in  overtime  are relatively cheap  when  productive 
hours  exceed  normal  hours  but,  when  they  are less,  it is 
expensive  to  retain  labour:  the  fixed  costs  of hiring  and 
firing  have  increased dramatically relative  to  overtime  rates 
and  hence  have  greatly strengthened  the  case  for this  kind 
of  argument •. 
These,  or similar,  explanations· can  be  found  in  other 
countries  where  the  recession  has  had  similar effects  on 
~·  1 
changes  in  employment-output  relationships  •  One  additional 
explanation,  which  has  received  much  more  attention  in  the 
US  than  elsewhere,  is that  unemployment· exerts  a  disciplinary 
effect  on  the  labour  force  (see,  for  example,  Oster  (1979)) 
through  an  increase  in  shop  floor discipline and/or  in  the 
productive effort of  employees. 
However,  all attempts  to  embody  these  explanations  in 
explicit structural hypotheses  can  be  seen  as  simple  amendments 
to  the  Brechling/Ball and  St.  Cyr  three-equation  model.  Take, 
for  example,  the  disciplinary effect of  unemployment,  variations 
in  the  adjustment  process  associated  with  the  pressure  of 
demand,  or  changes  in  the  long-run  productivity  trend  associated 
1.  See  Bolle  (1979)  on  Germany. 
,·  ' 
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with  the  pressure  of  demand.  These  effects  can  be  built into 
the  three  equations:  the  employment-hours  equation,  the  simple 
adjustment  process,  and  the  desired  demand  for. employment 
equation,  respectively.  Given  the data limitations that  we 
face,  the  reduced  form  which  we'can  estimate will not  dis-
criminate  between  these  hypotheses1,  but  more  importantly 
each  modification  is an  attempt  to  salvage  the  conventional 
model.  Not  one  of  them  has  been  developed  within  the  context 
of a  properly specified model  of the  labour market  - that 
remains  the  market  clearing  equilibrium  model  of neo-classical 
economics;  there  has  been  no  challenge  to  the  theoretical 
basis  of  the  conventional model,  which  could  offer a  realistic 
~  . 
alternative,  despite major  revelations  about  the  character and 
operation of  the  labour market  provided  by  labour market 
segmentation  theory  and  a  host  of micro-economic  studies. 
1.  Our  ability to test dynamic  specifications  have  been 
g~eatly improved  by  the  work  of Hendry  and  Mizen  (1978) 
and  Sargan  (1979). 
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B.  The  f,ailure  of the  conventional  model 
4.  The  structure of  a  labour  market  model: 
The  first  attempt  to  d~velo~ 'a  model  was  that  of  Holt 
and  David  (1966).  This  was  supposed  to  represent  the  dynamics 
of  the  labour market  and  to  show  the  existence  of  an  equilibrium. 
The  basis of  the  model  remained  the  conventional neo-classical 
assumptions  and  the  major  flows  in  the market  were  described 
by  functions  whose  derivatives  with  respect  to  endogenous 
arguments  were  well-defined.  The  model  therefore offered  no 
advance, in  terms  of specifying  precise  behaviour  nor  describing 
disequilibrium  changes.  Another  attempt,  developed  in  fact 
along  similar linea,  was  that of  Wickens  (1974).  He  was 
concerned  to  justify theoretically the partial adjustment 
model  in  conventional  use  - but  this was  only done  for  a 
single representative  firm  and  again  there  was  no  advance 
in  understanding  dynamics  and  disequilibrium  behaviour. 
Naderi  and  Rosen  (1973)  also  attempted  a  benavioural  explan-
ation  for  factors  of  production  withih  the  same  framework. 
In  a  previous  paper  (Tarling,  1979a),  I  have  attempted 
to  provide  a  model  to  establish  a  theoretical basis  for  an 
asymmetrical  adjustment  process  of  the  type  suggested  by 
Godley  and  Shepherd.  It can  be  shown  from  that analysis  that, 
even  retaining atomistic  markets  and  homogeneous  labour,  the 
existence  of voluntary quitting  and  differences  between  gross 
recruitment  and  gross  redundancies  are sufficient qualities 
of  the  model  to  give  rise to  a  variable  adjustment  process: - 12  -
that .is,  a  model  of  a  labour market  where  the  degree  of 
flexibility varies  with  the  pressure  of  demand  for  labour 
(see  Garonna  (1979)}.  A rather  unpleasant  finding  of  that 
paper  was  that structural models  of  the  labour market  are 
likely to  be  mathematically  lntr~c~able if behaviour is 
governed  by  flows ~  probabilities;  and  that,  even  when 
simplified  to  become  tractable,  the  demands  on  data  avail-
ability are  unlikely to  be  met. 
But  all of the  papers  have  a  common  set of relationships 
which  are  highlighted  as  crucial.  I  shall set these  out  below 
as  (2),  (3)  and  (4);  there is one  additional set which  I 
regard  as  crucial and  precedes  the  other three.  These  four 
areas  in  a  structural model  of  the  labour market  are: 
1.  The  relationship  between  the  demand  for  output, 
market  structure,  technology  employed  and  the 
demand  for  labour services. 
2~  The  relationship between  the  demand  for  labour 
services  and  the  demand  fo~ employees:  this 
is principally concerned  with  the  restrictions 
imposed  by  technology  and  the  buffer adjust-
ments  made  through  average  hours  of  work.  In 
fact,  it is easiest  to  think  of  this relation-
ship  as  that  part·· of  the  adjustment  to  meet 
the  aggregate  demand  for ·labour services  that 
can  be  achieved  by  a  single  firm  - an  internal 
adjustment  mechanism,  by  which  each  firm  has 
a  desired  recruitment  or redundancy  f~ow. 
3.  The  behaviour of  that  part  of  the  labour 
market  external to  individual  firms.  The 
gross  demands  for  employees,  which  comprise 
desired  net  stock  changes  and  replacement  of 
voluntary quits,  are  matched  in  whole  or in 
part  by  the  gross  supply,  which  includes  the 
voluntary quits,  the  unemployed  and  the  new· 
entrants:  what  is  important is  how  people 
choose  to  apply for  jobs,  how  employers 
choose  amongst  applicants  and  how  much  dis-
~  crimination there is affecting  these  choices. 
·. 
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4.  The  determinants  of  the  supply of labour, 
including  the  extent  of concealed  unemploy-
ment  (potential  employees)  outside  the 
observed  l~bour force  and  the  endogeneity 
of migration  flows. 
It is easy  now  to  show  ~hy the  conventional  model  of 
employment  demand  might  prove  to  be  unstable.  First, 
remember  that its theoretical basis  depends  on  an  atomistic 
market  and  either  homogeneous  or,  at best,  non-competing 
homogeneous  groups.  The  theoretical basis  then  can  be  seen 
as  containing  an  explanation  of  (1  ),  through  an  inverted 
production  function  with  exogenously  given  output,  and  of 
(2),  through  cost  minimising  behaviour  providing  an  adjust-
ment  internal to  the  firm  through  av
4er.age  hours  worked. 
There  may  also  be  an  element  of  (3)  giving  some  external 
adjustment  through  search  behaviour of quits.  But,  otherwise, 
markets  are  assumed  to clear - they must,  given  the  basic 
assumptions  of  the  approach.  When  .exam.ine.d  closely,  however, 
the  demand  for  employment  in  the conventional model,  and  in 
subsequent  expositions  with  more  detailed  a~justment costs 
(see,  for  example,  Nitkell~ (1978))·,  is still a  desired  demand; 
it is realised  only  by  virtue of the  fact  that markets  are 
atomistic  and  hence  clear.  Because  the  analysis is carried 
out  for  a  single representative  firm,  there is  no  aggregation 
problem;  friction  in  the  realisation of desired  demands  can 
only  be  introduced  by  search  models  using discrete time. 
There  is a  growing  body  of literature to fill this  gap 
on  implicit contracts,  particularly as  regards  the state of 
employment.  The  fundamental  proposition is that individuals 
seek  to stabilise their income  streams:  wages  in  employment - 14  -
contain  a  risk  premium  for  potential unemployment  and 
individuals are  covered  by  unemployment  insurance.  Recent 
work  in this field,  see  for  example  Grossman .(1979),  overlaps 
with  other theories of non-clearing markets;  they are  never-
theless of  t~e  neo-classica~  ge~~e. 
When  the  assumption  of atomistic  markets,  parti~ularly 
for  labour,  is dropped,  then  there are  a  multitude  of  reasons 
why  conventional .models  of  employment  will  give  unstable 
estimates.  In  terms  of  the  framework  of four  areas,  variations 
in market  control under  (1)  could  change  the  relationship 
between  output  and  the  demand  for  labour services;  changes 
in  internal· labour  market ·structures could,  under  ( 2},  · alter 
.  . 
the  relationship  between  the  demand  for  labour services  and 
the  demand  for  employees;  under  (3}~ a  change  in  volume  of 
voluntary  quitting  could  alter the  relationship  between 
desired  and  realised  employment;  and,  under  (4),  an  exogenous 
.  ' 
new  entry of  unskilled  labour  could alter the  recruitment 
policies of firms.  These  are  just a  few  examples  -·and  they 
are all additional  ~~  tho~e,  summarised  in·'section  A,  which 
appeared  when  the  conventional  ~cidel~  became  unstable  and 
which  are  a  priori just as  plausible. 
The  failure  of the  conventional  model  is therefore its 
inability to  cope  with  oligopolistic market  structures,  with 
the  empirical findings  of  labour  segmentation  theorists,  and 
with  the  heterogeneity  of  firms'  hiring  and  firing  policies 
observed  in detailed  micro-economic  studies.  If these  factors, 
which  are  now  well  documented  in  the literature,  could  be 
regarded  as  exogenous,  in  the  same  way  as  institutional and 
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social changes  are  seen  by  many  economists,  then  perhaps  we 
could  modify  the  conventional  model  to  meet  these failings. 
But  there is  a  growing  body  of opinion  which  regards  many 
of  these  phenomena  as  endogenous,  with  crucial interrelation-
ships  within  and  between  economic~  social and  institutional 
development. 
Perhaps  such  a  statement is opening  a  floodgate  which 
will  drown  any  attempt at  an  integrated  approach  in  a  sea  of 
comple~ity.  But,  because  of  the  growing  body  of  evidence 
contrary  to  the  conventional  model,  we  must  make  some  attempt; 
the  alternative confines  the  macro-economic  modeller  to  the  . 
role  of  fiddling  residuals,  potentially the  most  dangerous 
form  of  ad  hocery. - 16  -
C.  A  more  general  approach 
5.  The  economic  philosoph~: 
In  this section,  we  wirl  at~empt to  develop  a  wider 
explanation  of  behaviour  under  each  of the  four  headings 
outlined  for  a  framework  in  the  previous  section.  But, 
before  doing  so,  it is appropriate  to  question  the  philosophy 
underlying  the  presumptions  about  behaviour. 
The  conventional  model,  discussed  in  the  previous 
sections,  is concerned  with  the  search  for  efficiency in  a 
world  in  which  individuals -make  simultaneous  choices, 
rationa~,  fully  informed  or otherwise.  The  profit motive 
(or  cost  minimisation  in  the  short  run)  is  presumed  to 
operate  the  drive  towards  efficiency in  the  presence  or 
absence  of barriers  to  perfect  competition.  Monetarism  is 
'; 
simply  an  alternative model  of  general  equilibrium  in  this 
world.  The  polar  philosophy  is that of  Marx,  expressed  in 
his  writings  as  behaviour  govei.~ned  by  power~· authority  and  .  .  .. 
control  as  the  means  to  achieve  accumulation:  for  a  recent 
view,  see  Braverman  (1974).  The  dogmatic  Marxist  school is 
therefore asserting  behaviour  designed  to  maximise  exploit-
ation  and  the  ensuing  class  struggle is caused  by  resistance 
to  control. 
But  the  world  in  which  we  live does  not fit nicely  into 
either of these  paradigms.  Not  all firms  are  technologically 
efficient  nor  cost minimising  and  many  do  seek  to  exert  control 
over  the  labour  process.  On  the  other  hand,  the ability to 
~ '  ' 
I  f . 
,,  ' 
[ 
', 
l 
!\ 
!·. 
\ 
I 
f 
1 
i 
! 
t· 
,  I  : - 17  -
use  power,  to  legitimate authority  and  exert  control is not 
independent  of  the  technological  and  competitive  environment 
in  which  firms  operateo  Of  course,  each  of  these  paradigms 
has  their bastards  which  are  better approximations  of  the 
real world  - but  each  retaihs its parental  philosophy.  None 
deny  the  centrality of  the  process  of  accumulation  - but  how 
does  this  process  take  place? 
Institutions  and  social attitudes are  generally  accepted 
as  rigidities in  the  competitive  structure  of  the  economy: 
probably  as  a  consequence,  many  explanations  of their effect 
assume  that  both  are  relatively static.  But  there is  growing 
evidence  that institutions  evolve  and  social attitudas·change 
quite  quickly  so  that  there  is  need-t6  look  for  interaction. 
The  main  element  in  the  following  discussion  is the  role  of 
the  product  market  in  explaining  this  interaction  and 
governing  the  degree  to  which  efficiency and  exploitation 
can  be  invoked  as  the  means  in  the  process  of  accumulation. 
The  discussion  is focussed  in  this  way  on  the  subject  of 
labour  market  segmentation:  for  a  recent  di~cussion of  the 
literature,  see  Rubery  (1978)0 
6.  t1arket  st;:~ture and  v.sriatit11lS  i11.  demg: 
Consider first  a  single  firmo  Each  firm  receives  from 
the  market  far its output  demands  for  a  volume  of sales. 
These  demands  come  either from  a  wholesaler,  a  retailer,  a 
producer  using  the  product  as  an  input,  or direct  from  the 
consumer  market~  They  are  mat  either by  a  change  in  stocks - 18  -
of finished  goods,  a  change  in  production,  a  change  in  price 
or  some  combination  of  these.  Changes  in  the  volume  of 
produc~ion require  changes  in  the  use  of  inputs.  In  the 
short  run,  capital is a  fixed  cost but,  in  the  long  run,  it 
is not  and  the  tecbnology  employed  may  change:  for  a  given 
technology,  part of  the  required  labour input  is  a  fixed 
cost,  either complementary  to capital or  providing  administr-
ative  and  marketing  functions  invariant with  the  variation 
in  production  or sales but  the  remainder  of labour  input  is 
a  variable  even  in  the  short  run.  Costs  are  therefore  borne 
by  firms  either as  overheads  or  as  variable  costs:  variable 
costs,  for  a  given  production  process,  are  given  by  the 
volume  of  production  but  overheads  are  a  charge  against 
profit  on  the  current  volume  of  production. 
This  very  simple  statement  of  the  nature  of costs 
{much  better expressed  in  the  classical treatises)  suggests 
that there  i~ no  reason  to  doubt  t~~  r~tionality of short-
run  cost minimisation  by  employers.  But,  in  oligopolistic 
markets,  employers  can  spread  or  reduce  overheads  by  gaining 
control of their markets  and  attempt~ng to  control the 
variability of  the  demand  they  face.  Thus,  there  are  examples 
of  industries,  such  as  footwear  manufacture  and  food  manu-
facture,  where  a  few  or all firms  have  integrated  the  whole-
sale function  and  in  some  cases  the retail function  as  well 
into the  enterprise  {Ward  (1973)).  Ownership  of  the  retail 
outlets,  particularly with  a  large market  share,  not  only 
eliminates wholesale  and  retail margins  but  also  allows  the 
producer  to control his  level of  production  at  the  expense 
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of  the  consumer.  Such  attempts at  gaining  or maintaining 
market  control generally are  associated  with  undercutting, 
price/discount wars,  factoring  of imports  and  considerable 
inter-firm competition within  the  same  industry - that is, 
fragmented  co~petitive behaviour' between  employers.  But 
there  are  also  examples  of  cohesive  industry-wide action  to 
maintain  market  control within  a  complete  domestic  industry: 
for  example,  the  jute industry successfully  protected itself 
against  imports  through  the  combined  influence of  a  strong 
employers'  association  (Craig,  Rubery,  Tarling  and  Wilkinson 
(1979)). 
When  market  control cannot  be  gained  or  variations· in 
~  ' 
demand  are  too  large,  the  behavioural  assumption  of cost 
minimisation  requires  that  employers  look  for  ways  of shifting 
costs  onto  inputs;  labour is the·one  input  best suited  to 
bear  the  costs.  Such  shifting of costs is achieved  by 
increasing  the  elasticity of labour  input  and  reducing  the 
fixity of labour costs,  when  demand  declines  and  reducing 
.. 
turnover costs  when  ~t  ris~s.  In  conventional  segmentation_ 
theory,  this  means  a  decrease  or  incr~ase in  the  importance 
of internal labour market  structures;  more  generally,  it is 
a  reduction  or  increase in  the  labour  input  adjustment 
achieved  within  an  individual firm  by  changes  in utilisation 
(or  productivity)  of  employees  and  an  increase  or reduction 
in  the  net  outflow of  employees. 
Product  market  control can  be  seen  therefore as  an 
attempt  to  reduce  competition  among  producers  by  controlling 
entry  and  distribution.  Passing  the  costs  of adjustment - 20  -
forward  onto  the  consumer  is  however  a  risky activity since 
it requires  the  erection  and  maintenance  of  barriers to  entry 
and  control of  the  majority of  the distribution points  in  the 
market.  Such  control is achieved  generally  by  merger  activity 
or cartelisation of  a  market~  Merger  activity gains  market 
share  over  existing  producers  and  raises  the  scale of output 
and  distribution,  thereby  lowering unit costs  through  economies 
of scale  and  eliminating  the  threat of  competitive  new  entry. 
It does  however  create,  as  a  byproduct,  a secondary market; 
one  characteristic of large  scale production  is that it depends 
on  large  batch  or  continuous  flow  processes  and  hence  leaves 
room  in  the  ~ndustry  fo~ small  firms  catering for  small- batch 
or irregular specialist production orders. 
Mergers  can  be  seen  as  'aggressive'  or  'defensive'. 
Aggressive  mergers  are  attempts  to  extend  market  control  by 
absorbing  existing  producers,  and  may  or  may  not  be  accompanied . 
! 
by  rationalisation.  Defensive  mergers  are,  on  the  ether  hand, 
attempts  to maintain  market  share,  generally in  the  face  of 
foreign  competition  in  domestic  markets.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  their impact  on  employment,  it is important  to  know 
whether  mergers  are  to  achieve  vertical integration,  diversific-
ation of activity and/or markets,  or increases  in  the  scale 
of existing  processes. 
The  major  threats to  market  control  come  from  changes 
in  input  costs,  changes  in  international competition  and 
changes  in  technology.  Input  cost  changes  generally affect 
all firms  in  an  industry  to  a  similar extent:  when  there  are 
dramatic  changes,  market  share  gains  can  be  made  either  by 
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being  able  to  control average  unit cost of the  inputs,  as 
possibly in the  case  of labour,  or being able  to switch  away 
from  the input,  such  as  switching out of oil use  in the  early 
1970s.  One  defence  against international competition already 
mentioned  is the  defensive merger;  an  alternative ia to diversify 
into other markets  or specialise generally in quality products 
in the  face  of penetration af the market  for mass-produced 
goods. 
Technological  advance is perhaps  the  one  process least· 
understood.  In  a  neo-classical world,  information is freely 
available and  there are  few  if any  barriers to attaining the 
technological frontier.  In  Marxist analysis,  the advance  of 
technical progress  increases the  control of the capitalist 
class over  the  mode  of organisation of production.  Historically, 
inventors  tended  to  become  entrepreneurs  in their own  right, 
primarily in order to retain control over their ·innovation 
and  hence  their market  power.  More  recently,  expenditures 
on  research  and  davelop•ent  have  increased  and it is generally  /. 
developments  indigenoua.to enterprises which  have  the  major 
impactJ  the information on  the  'blueprint'  is in fact  probably 
diffused  by  the act of consumption  (aa  argued  by  Gomulka 
(1971)).  The  initial benefit of a  tech"ological advance ia 
a  gain  in market  share;  but  there is no  guarantee of maintaining 
the lead  in the  longer  run.· 
Thus,  the  demand  for labour services is dependent  an 
the  product market  in a  very  complex  way.  It ia nat  simply 
·a question of the variations in the  volume  of demand  but •ore 
the ability of the  producer ta maintain control over hie - 22  -
market  share  and  the  speed  with  which  he  can  alter his  average 
unit casts of production.  Market  control is achieved  by  merger 
or a  technological advantage  but,  given  that mast  inputs  except 
labour are  more  or lass complementary with  the technological 
process  and  variable with  the  volume  of production,  the  most 
important  element  in  a  firm's  ability to  adapt  ia the  fixity 
of his  labour costa. 
Let  ua  consider three cases.  First,  consider an  expanding 
market  for  the  output  of  ~n industry.  It is probably  worthw~ile 
to distinguish  two  cases:  where  the  expansion  ia  due  to  penetr-
ation in  export markets  and  where  the  expansion  ia  due  ta 
competitive advantage in the domestic  market  (e.g.  a  relative 
price change  due  to technological advance  increasing the market 
by  attracting demand  away  from  aubatitutea).  Second,  consider 
a  declining market.  Again,  let us  separate  twa  cases,  one 
where  the  decline is due  to decline in  the total market  for 
the  commodity  and  the other where  the  domestic  market  ia heavily 
penetrated  by  imports.  Third,  we  can  consider  a  stable market, 
either open  ar closed  in  terms  of foreign  competition. 
In  the case  of an  expanding  market,  there will in general 
be  a  care  group of firma  who  either made  the initial advance 
in  product design,  made  the  breakthrough  in international 
markets  or began  with  an  aggressive merger  and  rationalisation 
to achieve  a  competitive advantage.  In  general,  unit coats 
will decline as  a  result of  economies  of scale and/or rationalia-
atian and  hence  the demand  far labour services will riaa more 
alowly  than output.  But it beca•ea crucial to •inimisa labour 
coats  to maintain  the advantage.  Other  firma  in the industry 
I·· 
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f without  the  competitive advantage  are at least initially 
unlikely to  face  a  declining level of demand  as well as  the 
decline in market  ahara.  But  the  threat is there.  Twa 
alternative strategies are  possible  (there are  probably more). 
Either the firms  attempt  to  compete  by  merging  - which  is 
unlikely to  be  successful given  the initial gains  of the  core -
or the  firms  can  attempt to carve out for  themselves  a 
specialist market,  either in quality products or  by  specialist 
or small  batch  ~reduction servicing the  core  firms.  In  eitWer 
''case,  the level of  demand  is variable and  uncertainf  hence  a 
need  to  increase  the  fle~ibility of labour costs. 
The  primary difference  between  an  international and  a 
domestic  expansion  lies in the effect on  non-core  firms:  in 
the  former  case,  the  level of demand  initially is less likely 
to decline than  in the latter case  and  hence  many  firma  remain 
reasonably profitable and  potentially able  to  adapt. 
For  a  declining market,  the difference  between  total 
market  decline  and  foreign  penetration is likely to  be  the 
speed  at which  the  domestic  market  decreases  and  hence  the 
time  available in which  to adapt.  Slow  market  declines  may 
again  generate mergers,  this time  defensive,  and  create a 
core  and  secon~ary sector of firms.  If successful mergers 
are made,  then the  bulk  of the decline may  be  borne  in the 
secondary sector.  Import  penetration means  fast decline and, 
particularly in recent years,  very little opportunity  to 
compete  because of the  enormous  differences in unit coats. 
Mergers  and  other forma  of rationalisation are unlikely ta 
improve  the competitive paaitiona  some  firma ••intain their market  control by  factoring  the  imports,  particularly where 
the  good  may  be  considered aa  inferior if marketed  by  country 
I 
of origin,  but this is not  a  long  term  strategy.  Import 
penetration on  this scale is nearly always  in maaa  Markets of 
bulk  orders  and  thus  does  leave  room  for  a  domestic  aector 
producing quality  goods  and  small batches. 
Once  again,  the  secondary sector  (~hich may  be all that 
remains  in a  penetrated market)  always  requires flexibility 
of labour coat.  But,  in the  caae  of declining markets,  there 
is less obvious  reason  for core  firma  to internaliee labour 
coat,  that is,  a  primary sector in this case  may  well have 
less fixity of labour coat than  a  primary sector in an 
expanding market. 
We  have  argued  that changes  in market  size for  an 
industry's product will tend  to create a  core or primary 
sector and  a  secondary sector:  the  former  is characterised 
by  a  greater desire for labour coat fixity than  the latter. 
Because  the  technology  employed  in the  primary sector is 
generally mare  advanced,  more  rationalised or on  a  larger. 
scale,  a  greater degree of labour coat fixity doea  nat 
eliminate ita competitive advantage,  although  the degree  of 
fixity may  be  ~imited by  the  degree of competitive advantage 
held. 
A stable market,  with  constant shares  and  slowly  changing 
levels of demand,  will in general  have  already inherited  some 
kind  of industrial structure involving  a  core  and  secondary 
sector of pxoduction.  The  level ·of  unit coats ia probably 
•  function of concentration but  there ahould  be  a  fairly atable 
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• relationship between  changes  in demand  for  the output of the 
industry and  the  aggregate  demand  by  the  firms  in the  industry 
for  labour services.  This will nat in general  be  the  case  for 
an  industry where  market  size is changing  rapidly or market 
shares are  changing. 
Thus  the  demand  far labour services in  an  industry is a  . 
function of the  size of the  primary sector  (perhaps  proxied 
by  concentration)  for  a  given  technology  and it can  be  expected 
to  change  in line with  production  except  where  market  shares 
and  market  size are  changing.  Changes  in market  shares, 
reflecting increased  concentration,'will be  associated  with 
declining unit  labour costs  on  average  but  the effect will be 
greater the  more  rapid is the  growth  of market  size.  Decreases 
in market  size will tend  to raise the  average  unit labour costa 
in the  industry most  when  concentration is declining  aa  mass 
producers  are  eliminated  by  foreign  competition  and  least when 
there are defensive  mergers. 
All of this discussion  has  been  as if we  were  dealing 
with  a  single industry.  However,  the  aggregate  industria+ 
mix  is important,  especially as  regards  the  balance  of inter-
mediate,  capital goods  and  consumption  goods  producers.  Apart 
from  the variations  in average  capital intensity of production, 
the  extent of vertical integration or disintegration in  the 
whole  production  process  for  a  commodity  affects  the  degree 
of market  control which  each  producer  has  and  the  degree  to 
which .he  can  pass  costa  forward  or backwards  in the  process. 
In  the discussion of market  control, little was  said about 
cartelisation of markets or abaut  unity of interest a•ong enterprises.  The  ability to carteliae a  market  or to  form 
a  strong  employers  association is obviously of considerable 
importance  in determining  the  extent of market  control. 
Whilst  the literature contains  some  discussion of the  form-
ation  end  streaaea of cartels,  very little hea  been written 
on  the  origins  and  strength of  employers  association.  One 
factor  implied .by  the  above  discussion is that employers 
a•wnciationw  ma~ b•  farmed  or ;ivan unity af  interest  by 
external or internal threats  to  market  size or market  aherea. 
For  example,  the  threat ·of  import  penetration  and  the 
technological  changes  resu~ting from  the  use  of polypropelena 
caused  concerted  action  in  the Jute industry:  by  contrast, 
however,  threat of  import  penetration led  to conflicts in 
the  employers association in  Cutlery  and  an  increase  in 
internal competition.  To  some  extent,  the  outcome  may  be 
explained  by  the  traditional perspectives of  the associations: 
in  particular,  those derived  from  trade  associations  (generally 
the  case  in Clothing  and  Textiles)  are  more  concerned  with 
market  development  and  protection whereas  those with  a  lo~g 
history of technical  change  and  strong  trade  union  presence 
are ~ore oriented  towards  industrial relations.  Thus,  some 
are  relevant  to  the  discussion  in this section  and  influenced 
b~ the  product market  whereaa  others ere  perhaps  mare  relevant 
to  the  discussion  in the  next  section. 
By  defining  primary  and  secondary  sectors  above  in  terms 
of market  control  and  flexibility of unit costs of production, 
we  have  greatly simplified  the  wider debate of labour  segment-
ation theory  and  the  problem  of  low  pay.  In  the study  by - 27  -
Craig,  Rubery,  Tarling  and  Wilkinson  (1979),  the  following 
findings  emerged  (p.  41): 
'Secondary  industrial sectors  in  the  industrial 
structure vary  in  function  and  character  from 
being  active  and  successful competitors  with 
primary  sectors  (baking  and  cutlery),  providers 
of  complementary services and  products  (paper 
box),  bearers of  primary  sector· risk  (stamped 
or pressed  metal-wares)  or·the remains  of  a 
now  obsolete industrial sector  (jute). 
Secondary  industrial sectors should  thus  not 
be  viewed  as  residuals,  or marginal or 
peripheral industries.' 
This  follows  a  definition of secondary sectors  (p.  33)  as 
those  which 
'offer low  wages,  insecure  employment  prospects, 
and  informal  payment  structures;  minimum  rates 
are determined'either  by  the  market  or  by  some 
system  of  regulation at the  industry level 
(minimum  wage  laws  or  national  voluntary 
collective bargaining  agreements).  Firms  in 
the  secondary  sector are small,  traditional, 
use  labour-intensive  traditional technology, 
and  are  subject to  competitive  product markets 
which  are  often  in  decline or cyclically 
unstable.  Unionisation  ia weak,  and  there is 
little local bargaining.' 
The  simplified definition adopted  earlier is appropriate as 
a  static classification.  The  report  quoted  above  shows  that 
the wider definition must  be  used  when  analysing  the  dynamic 
and  interactive process  of development  of market  and  industrial 
structure,  and  the institutional framework  associated with 
these structures. 
In  particular,  low  pay  and  unstable  employment  conditions 
exist in different industries for different  reasons.  from  the 
quoted  definition of secondary sectors,  we  can  pick  out  aspects 
and  relate  them  to  the  product  market  environments  described - 28  -
earlier:  that is,  different  product  market  environments  would 
ley  emphasis  on  different factors  in  the definition of  a 
secondary  sector.  Each  implies  a  different relationship 
between  output,  unit labour cost  and  employment,  something 
which  must  ultimately  be  taken  into account  in  a  macro-
economic  relationship. 
The  foregoing  discussion  shows  that,  even  in analysis 
of the  short-run  behaviour,· it is not  appropriate  to  take 
output  as  given.  The  conventional models  do  and  so  do  the 
more  institutional arguments  baaed  on  defining  employer/ 
employee  strategies.  We  have  argued  that the  degree  of 
market  control,  both  in the short and  the  long  run,  is of 
crucial importance  in determining  the  nature  and  flexibility 
of labour costs desired  by  the  employer.  Strategies  by  either 
employers  or employees  must  therefore  be  placed  in the  context 
of the  product market. 
7.  The  demand  for  labour services  and  the  demand  for  employees: 
In  this section,  we  will be  primarily concerned  with  the 
behaviour  of individual firma  in differing market  environments. 
The  principle  ~ubject is the  area  generally referred  to as 
'work  organisation'  and  its relationship to  the fixity of 
labour casta and  technology. 
a)  From  the  employers  point of view: 
In  the  previous  section,  attention was  focussed  on  the 
conditions  in which  firma  could  exercise  market  control through 
the  product market or through  the  labour market.  Growth  of 
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markets,  market  shares,  international competition  and  new 
technology  were all seen  as  important  elements  in the dis-
cussion of when  firms  might  enhance  their competitive  position. 
Very little was  said  about  how  firms  might  achieve  the  changes. 
We  described  the  different ways  in which  markets  may  change 
and  suggested  what  the  responses  would  be  for  individual firms 
and  how  that may  alter  (and  determine}  the industrial structure. 
Two  responses,  one  by  the  introduction of  new  technology  and 
the  other  by  merger  activity,  were  designed  to  gain  a  competitive 
advantage  by  lowering unit  coats  of production:  merger 'activity 
was  also  seen  as  a  potentially defensive act to mitigate  the 
impact  of increased  domestic  or  foreign  competition.  The 
third  response  was  by  firms  who  were  (because  of unfavourable 
I 
competitive  conditions}  without  any  substantial degree  of 
I 
control in  the  product market  and  hence  were  forced  to maintain  j 
a  competitive  position,  almost  on  a  day-to-dsy basis,  by  / 
achieving flexibility of unit  input cost.  But  there is also  j 
i 
an  additional category of firms,  who  almost  independently of 
product  market  conditions,  can  establish secondary  employmeDt 
conditions  and  hence  flexible  labour coste  because of the 
existence of appropriate  labour market  conditione  and  labour 
supply. 
b)  From  the  employees  point of  view: 
The  view  above  is taken  largely from  the  employers  side, 
with  efficiency as  the motive  for  aggressive  product  market 
behaviour  and  explaitation as  the motive  for  defensive 
market  behaviour.  What  then  ia  the  response  of labour?  Not 
surprisingly,  the  attempts  to  reduce  unit labour coats  bring ---------·  --· ----
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about  a  more  militant response  the  more  existing employees 
have  to lose.  Thus,  when  new  technology is introduced or 
mergers  contemplated  in static or declining markets,  the 
implication of  a  net loss of  jobs  has  a  major effect in 
determining  the  degree of resistance.  Resistance is not 
necessarily confined  to the  firm  or firma  involved  but  may 
well  be  industry-wide.  It is unlikely that  the  additional 
earnings  (if any)  of those  who  remain  in  employment  will be 
enough  to  secure  acquiescence  by  the majority  to  the  change: 
although  the introduction of redundancy  payments  has  un-
doubtedly  influenced  a  few  decisions.  When  the  number  of 
alternative  jobs is increasing,  resistance will probably  be 
much  less:  this is particularly true when  alternative  employ-
ment  can  be  found  within  the  same  enterprise since the  costa 
and  obstacles to mobility are  much  reduced  in general.  But 
the  resistance also  depends  on  the  extent of plant,  enter-
prise or industry  union  organisation of the affected  labour 
force. 
The  ability of firms  in  the  secondary  sector of  an 
industry to achieve  the  required flexibility of unit labour 
cost is frequently  associated with  the  absence  of unionis-
ation of  the affected section of the  labour  forceo  Although 
many  of  these  firms  have  skilled or semi-supervisory operatives 
who  may  well  be  unionised,  the  bulk  of the  operative  labour 
force  is obtained  from  new  entry  to  the  labour force  or highly 
mobile  sections of the labour force,  such  as  young  people, 
married  women  and  immigrants.  There  are also  examples  where 
craft-baaed uniona  have  aurvived  who,  because of their ariata-
r 
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cratic  pretensions,  have  created  and  perpetuated  a  more 
tenuous  relationship with  employers  which  enables  a  greater 
flexibility of  employmentc  But  the  major  obstacle  to  organised 
resistance  to  change  is the  fragmentation  of  employment  and 
the  high  cost  of  organising  ths  labour,  reinforced  by  the 
'family ethicv  generated  in  many  small  firma. 
Thus  the  ability to  achieve  change,  either in  the  long 
run  or  in  the  short  run~  d~penda on  the  degree  of unionisation. 
This  organisation  of labour  may  be  (and  generally will  be) 
the  formal  trade  union  organisation  but  resistance  may  also 
be  found  because  of  a  perception of community  interest by  the 
employees  affected  by  changes.  However,  to  appeal  to  trade 
union  organisation is not  constructiveQ  We  know  that  member-
ship  changes  and  that  the  motives  and  cohesion  of  the  rank 
and  fila  are  not  given  independently of  the  environment. 
Thus  we  must  discuss  the  factors  which  determine  the  degree 
of  organisation  among  labour  forces  in different industries. 
c)  Bureaucratic structures  and  internal labour markets: 
There  is  an  abundance  of literature,  both  in  the  field 
of industrial relations  and  in  sociologyt  which  discusses 
the  structures of  bureaucracies  and  the  hierarchical control 
over  the  produciion  and  work  processe  But  relatively little 
of it is  concerned  with  its evolution  and  development.  Moat 
of  the  arguments  are  centred  around  tha  issue of control, 
for  a  variety of motives,  but  seen  as  ways  of containing 
the  conflicts without  reference  to  the  power  and  authority 
of specific interest  groups  in  specific situations.  And 
yet  the  relative strengths  of  amployere  and  employees  in - 32  -
industrial conflict must  be  explicable  in  terms  of the  factors 
which  underlie  the  unity of interest groups.  For  employers, 
we  have  already  argued  that  these factors  are  to  be  found  in 
the Market  structure  and  changing  competitiveness.  For 
employees,  we  must  look at the  previous  history of the  diviaion 
of labour and  the social history of  groups  of  employees. 
~Some very interesting historical studies  have  been  written, 
particularly by  Zeitlin  (1979)  and  by  Elbaum  ~nd Wilkinson 
(1979).  The  broad  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these studies 
is that  an  active role is to  be  accredited  to  employers  with 
respect  to  market  factors  and  employees  are  passive  - their 
underlying  unity lies in  the  long  run  issue of control over 
the  work  process  and  it is this degree  of control which 
becomes  threatened  by  employers  responses  to  market  factors 
and  stimulates  a  response. 
Weber's  theory of bureaucratic structures is of .little 
use  in  this context  since it does  not  relate to  technology 
employed.  Woodward  (1970)  however,  has  attempted  a  mapping 
between hierarchical structures  and  technical complexity of. 
the activity.  The  hierarchical structures are characterised 
by 
1.  the  levels of authority in  the  managerial 
hi~rarchy, 
2.  the  span  of control  (number  of subordinates), 
3.  the  span  of control of the  chief executive, 
4.  the  ratio of managerial  and  supervisory 
staff to total personnel, 
5.  the  ratio of indirect and  ATC  labour  to 
hourly  paid  labour, 
6.  the  amount  of written  communication,  and 
1.  the  specialization of  the  functions  of 
management. 
Characteristics 1,  3,  4,  5  and  7  map  in positive relation 
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into technical  complexity of the  production  process  whereas 
characteristics 2  and  6  increase  and  then  decrease  aga~n. 
The  production  processes  range  from  simple  unit  production 
through  small batch,  large  batch  and  mass  production  to  con-
tinuous  flow  production.  In  essence,  it is being  argued  that 
more  uniform  inputs  and  routinized  work  flows,  particularly 
those  which  can  be  deduced  from  a  set of rules,  are associated 
with  more  centralised  and  formalized  structures,  whereas  tasks 
which  are difficult,  complex  or  unusual  are  generally associated 
with  decentralised  structures.  This  approach will give  rise 
to  a  polymorphism  of organisations  such  as  we  observe  but it 
reads  nonetheless  like a  management  blueprint. 
To  some  extent,  the  same  criticism can  be  made  against 
the  theory of internal labour markets  discussed  by  Doerringer 
and  Piore  (1971 ).  Internal labour markets  are characterised 
by  limited  and  selective ports of entry,  clearly defined 
promotional  and  career hierarchies,  explicit systemsof  reward, 
commitment  of  employees  to  the  enterprise end  limited mobility 
out  of  the market.  The  characteristics of internal and  external 
labour markets  can  fairly easily  be  amalgamated  with  Woodward's 
bureaucratic variables and  technical descriptions  to  give  a 
reasonable  desc~iption'of the  wide  variety of organisational 
forms  found  in  practice.  However,  some  of the  arguments  under-
pinning  internal labour markets  have  a  specific interest to 
the  argument  developed  in this  paper.  The  development  of 
internal labour markets  in order to minimise  transaction costa 
in labour and  induce-more  productive effort  (or at· least leas 
absenteeism)  can  be  aaen  aa  Motivated  by  cost conaiderationa - l4  -
by  employers  whereas  the  workforce  accepts  the structure 
because  of  the  employment  stability it provides  in  the  short 
run  end  for  the  future,  ea  well  as  potentially higher  pecuniary 
rawarda  end  a  greeter degree  af worker  organisation  (at leaat 
over  the  workforce if not  over  the  production  process). 
From  this discussion,  we  begin  to  see  how  it is possible 
to integrate market  factors  with  work  organisation.  Technical 
change  requires  a  modified  bureaucratic structure which  in 
turn  seeks  to create or alter institutionalised employer-
employee  relationships,  loosely  termed  above  as  an  internal 
labour market.  The  response  of  employees  will depend  on  the 
segmentation of the internal labour market  (which  will be  a 
function  of the historical changes  in  the  division of labour) 
measured  by  the  absence  of overlapping interests for different 
groups  and  on  the  extent to  which  the  existing hierarchy of 
employment  structure has  been  socialized outside  the  workplace 
as  part of the  social hierarchy. 
According  to  Doerringer  and  Piore  (1971),  the  main 
characteristics of the internal wage  structure are  the 
authority  vested  in it by  job  evaluation,  the  use  af  community 
wage  surveys  and  engineered  production standards.  The  purpose 
is to  grade  the  jobs,  assess  whether  these  are  reasonably 
competitive  (at least locally)  and  possibly  to  introduce merit 
or  payment  by  results  schemes.  The  latter two  are  clearly 
motivated:  reasonable  wage  levels ensure  minimum  attraction 
of jobs outside  the  internal labour market  structure and  PBR 
ayatema,  by  setting  a  fairly  low  standard  output level,  give 
satisfaction within  the exiating atructure.  However,  jab 
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grading is a  major  area  of dispute.  Whilst  the  purpose  in 
general is to establish  a  definite and  easily observed  hier-
archy  of  jobs,  the  system is in principle  open  to  abuse  by 
the  employer  as  a  means  of controlling his  costs.  There  are 
some  good  examples  of  job  regrading  in  response  to  the  Equal 
Pay  Act  in  the  UK,  in which  new  grading  structures  have 
effectively maintained  the  division of  jobs  by  sex  and  the 
relative  pay  levels.  Overall,  however,  the  internal labour 
market  structure,  so  long  as it remains  relatively closed, 
provides  for  the  employer  a  stable unit  labour cost which 
can  be  predicted  in  the  short  run  with  a  reasonable  degree 
of certainty. 
Doerringer  and  Piore  pick  out  eleven  instruments of 
adjustment:  1)  wage  and  nonwage  compensation,  2)  internal 
allocative rates,  3)  the  job structure,  4)  managerial 
procedure,  5)  job  vacancies,  6)  subcontracting,  7)  overtime, 
B)  hiring standards,  9)  recruitment  procedures,  10)  screening 
procedures  and  11)  training.  They  suggest  that instruments 
1),  2),  3)  and  4)  are  governed  by  workplace  custom  and  'are 
part of decision  processes largely unrelated  to  the  resolution 
of labour market  imbalances'.  The  remaining  instruments  are 
frequently  used  and  'selection  among  these  instruments 
approximates  their relative coats and  benefits•.  'This  view 
suggests  that there are limits to  the  rate  and  volume  of 
labour force  adaptations  which  the  internal labour  market 
can  provide at any  point in time,  and  emphasizes  the  costs 
of the  adjustment  proceaa.'  It should  however  be·  recognised 
that the difficulties af adjustment are greater than  those 
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envisaged  by  Daerringer and  Piore,  particularly as  regards 
reducing  labour input.  Action  on  job  vacancies is limited 
by  promotion  aspirations  among  employees,  overtime is 
recognised  as  a  relatively permanent  part of weekly  pay  and 
subcontracting is only feasible if the  employed  labour force 
can  be  reduced.  The  remaining  elements,  dealing with  recruit-
ment  standards  and  procedures,  together with  training,  do  nat 
allow  a  great deal of change  in the  stock  of labour.  Thus 
internal labour markets  are only feasible  when  the  demand 
for  labour input is reasonably stable:  too  much  strain an 
the structure,  through  attempts  to increase or decrease  the 
labour force  quickly  and  by  large numbers,  will almost 
certainly undermine  the  acceptance of the  rules of the 
structure. 
We  have  already suggested  that technical change  imposes 
a  substantial strain on  employer-employee  relationships, 
whether  institutionalised or not.  But,  having  discussed 
internal labour market  structures,  we  can  see  that  those 
structures contain little flexibility through  which  to  cope 
with substantial technical change.  It is evident  from  the 
empirical literature that technical change  is not  in fact 
used  by  employ~rs either to  increase the division of labour 
or to de-skill the workforce:  these  may  be  outcomes  but  the 
essential ingredient of the decision to  implement is the 
standard  assessment  of cost  savings.  However,  it is  bec~ming 
increasingly clear that implementation of technical change 
in an  institutionalised workplace  structure is no  easy matter. 
The  provision of alternative employments  for displaced  workers 
~ 
I  .. 
I 
'  t 
I  I  , 
i 
l 
I 
t 
I 
I 
I 
,.,.. 
I - 37  -
helps  to alleviate  the stresses,  especially when  they are  to 
be  found  within  the  same  structure.  But,  where  a  net  reduction 
in  jobs is required,  there is considerable opposition  to  the 
change  which  frequently is ultimately met  by  concessions  to 
manning  levels,  operating speeds  or maintenance-and  repair 
schedules.  That  is,  a  part of the anticipated coat-savings 
are  not  realised  in order to  implement  the  change.  Thus 
technical change,  at least in the context of institutionalised 
employer-employee  relationships,  is likely to achieve  greats~ 
competitive  gains  in  expanding  product markets  where  the 
demand  for labour is rising,  out  of the  effects of the 
technical change. 
We  have  argued  above  that internal labour market 
structures are associated with  a  high  degree  of fixity in 
unit labour costs  and  that the  potential gains  of technical 
change  may  be  reduced  by  concessions  to  achieve  implementation. 
How  do  industries or firms  cope  with significant variations 
in  demand  which  require frequent  and  large  changes  in  the 
demand  for  labour input?  The  answer  which  we  have  suggested 
in an  earlier section is that  they either subcontract the 
volatile or small  batch/unit production  element in their. 
product  demand  or they must  achieve  a  greater degree  of flex-
ibility in their labour coat - note  that this is necessary 
for the subcontractor. 
d)  Flexibility in the  use  of  labour: 
The  dual  labour market  theory of  Doerringer and  Piare 
'argues  that the  labour market  ia divided  into a  primary  and 
a  secondary market.  Jobs  in the  primary market  poaaeaa - 31  -
several of the  following  characteristics:  high  wages,  good 
working  conditions,  employment  stability,  chances  of advance-
ment,  equity,  and  due  process in the administration of work 
rules.  Jobs  in the  secondary  market,  in contrast,  tend  to 
have  low  wages  and  fringe  benefits,  poor  working  conditions, 
high  labour  turnover,  little chance  of advancement,  and  often 
arbitrary and  capricious supervisiow.  By  introducing  queuing 
theory,  they  argue  that the  primary sector is characterised 
by  an  overlapping hierarchy of internal labour markets  feeding 
when  necessary  from  the potential supply of labour  employed 
in  the  secondary sector.  Furthermore,  they  argue  that  'there 
are distinctions  between  workers  in the  two  sectors which 
parallel those  between  jobs:  workers  in the  secondary sector, 
relative to those  in the  primary sector,  exhibit  greater 
turnover,  higher rates of lateness and  absenteeism,  more 
insubordination,  and  engage  more  freely in petty theft and 
pilferage'.  These  characteristics,  it is believed,  are 
either inherent or  imposed  by  the  Job  practice or imposed 
by  primary sector employers  (as  a  form  of statistical dis- . 
crimination),  and  hence  the majority of these  employees  are 
confined  to the  secondary sector. 
This  contr~st, or dual  market  hypothesis,  is much  too 
stringent a  discontinuity to  have  much  practical significance 
and  also  draws  a  line between  job conditions  much  lower  down 
the  hierarchy  than is appropriate  to  the  argument  of this 
paper.  One  question  which  the  theory  does  raise which  ia 
relevant ia the  extent to which  the  jobs  or  job practices 
generate  the characteriatica of secondary sector workers or 
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whether it is that the  individuals already  have  these 
characteristics.  It is abundantly  evident  that  there  are 
disadvantaged  workers,  particularly those  with  physical or 
mental disabilities.  Beyond  that,  however,  empirical  evidence 
appears  to  be  circumstantial and  the  employment  histories of 
other so-called disadvantaged  groups  may  be  a  consequence  of 
statistical discrimination rather  than  inherent  employment 
instability. 
It is however  true  that certain  groups  in  the  labour 
market  have  a  relatively weak  attachment  to  the  labour force 
.  . 
or to  particular  jobs.  The  young,  particularly those  without 
educational requirements,  use  job mobility  as  a  way  of  pro-
greasing  and  gaining  on-the-job training;  the  older age  groups 
may  be  near  retirement or  even  post retirement or in receipt 
of  an  occupational  pension  and  hence  uninterested .in  the con-
tinuance  of  the  job;  married  women,  particularly those  with 
young  children,  seek  only  part-time  jobs  in restricted  hours 
and  may  be  prepared  to  work  at  lower  hourly  rates;  and  young 
women,  either married  without  children or  unmarried,  have  a  , 
high  expectancy of leaving  employment  either at marriage  or 
at the first confinement.  Thus  there  are  groups  of employees 
who,  because  of  ~heir personal circumstances,  either have  a 
high  expectancy of quitting or are  prepared  to  work  at lower 
rates of  pay  to  secure  the  desired  hours  of work. 
These.groups  of  employees,  together  with  migrant  labour, 
form  a  pool of labour whose  potential mobility and  acceptance 
of the  rates of  pay  can  be  exploited  by  employers  seeking  to 
minimise  unit labour coat variations.  Subcontractors,  small ··~----------·--------·------------------·--------------
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batch  producers  and  service  trades are  frequently  found  to 
have  senior skilled operators,  of wham  some  or all will have 
a  concession to staff status,  who  effectively supervise  a 
shop  manned  mainly  by  employees  from  the  above-mentioned 
groups.  The  subcontracting may  even  be  at the level af home-
or out-working,  and  may  be  organised  by  a  craftsman,  aa  is 
done  by  the  'little master'  in the cutlery trade. 
These  are rather obvious  ways  of increasing the flex-
ibility of unit labour coats,  and  are  achieved  by  the flex-
ibility in the  employmant  rather than  the  level of remuner-
ation.  Traditionally,  forms  of remuneration  such  aa  piece 
rates,  sliding scales related  to  product  prices  and  task-
rates  (see,  for  example,  Schloss  (1898)  for  a  survey of 
nineteenth  century  systems  of  pay)  have  provided  the  required 
degree  of flexibility.  But  the  development  of  a_  national 
wage  structure and  the  emergence  of administered  rather than 
market  determined  prices  reduced  the flexibility in average 
wages.  Where  piece  rates survive,  their downward  flexibility 
is now  restricted  by  the  extensive use  of minimum  earnings, 
levels and,  in the current recession,  the  reduction  in  the 
gains  and  importance  of plant level bargaining.  Thus  the 
growth  of real.wage  resistance  and  the  squeeze  on  local 
settlements in recessions  has  greatly reduced  the  potential 
of  wage  flexibility. 
The  form  of subcontracting  and  labour organisation  in 
Construction is an  interesting  example  of the achievement  of 
labour cost flexibility.  Traditionally,  the  establishment 
of craft-based  unions  created  a  system of information  about 
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job availability within  a  specified occupational range.  In 
the  nineteenth  century,  there was  a  'tramping'  system  for 
carpenters  and  a  number  of related craftsmen  whereby  the  union 
provided  support  and  information  for  an  individual who  moved 
from  district to district in search of work.  Although  many 
craft-based unions  have  ceased  to exist or  been  absorbed  into 
general or industrial unions,  internal labour market  types  of 
structure exist across  firms  within  a  specified occupational 
range  and its origins  can  be  traced  back  to  the old  tramping 
system.  What  these  structures allow is a  flexibility for the 
employer,  and  information about alternative  employment  in a 
market  which  has  restricted rates of  new  entry.  Thus,  again, 
except  for  large  changes  in  demand,  such  a  craft-based  system 
can  provide  greater flexibility to  the  employer  and  a  semi-
independent  status for  the  employee.  This  has  not  prevented 
the  creation of industrial internal labour market  structures 
in Construction  but  these only  tend  to occur with sufficient 
guarantees of market  demand  far construction services,  and 
very  much  seems  to  have  depended  on  the  growth  of public 
expenditure. 
Labour-only subcontracting,  that is mobile  workgroups, 
have  recently  ~ecome subject to criticism and  attempted 
control as  a  result of apparent  increases in  evasion of tax 
and  social security contributions.  But  evasion  seems  to  have 
provided  the  incentive far the  development  of  ~nformal markets 
in both  production  and  service sectors in  a  number  of countries 
in recent years.  The  incentives are obvious:  by  evading  the 
full coat of employees  and  any  contractual commitment,  the 
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employer  achieves  unit cost reductions  and  greater flexibilityJ 
by  avoiding statutory deductions,  the  employees  can  increase 
their take-home  pay,offer their services at lower  graaa  rates 
and  accept intermittent spells of unemployment. 
e)  Flexibility through  hours  worked: 
The  most  usual form  of adjusting  ~abour input,  particularly 
for  small changea,ia variation in hours worked- either changes 
in overtime  or short-time working.  The  naive  view  of  overti~e 
is that it is a  few  hours  added  on  at the  end  of the  day,  and 
perhaps  a  little weekend  work.  Whilst this is common  amongst 
small-sized firms,  it is replaced  in medium  and  large-sized 
firms  by  shift systems,  sometimes  predicated  by  the  technology 
(as  in continuous  flow  processes  or multi-staged production 
activities)  or  sometimes  just a  traditional form  of working. 
There  are  numerous  types of shifts,  varying  from  the  simple 
day/night shift through  3-shift systems,  double-day shift 
systems  and  twilight shifts to the continental shift system. 
Except  where  demanded  by  the  technology,  the shift. system is 
not  a  permanent  and  rigid feature  but it is generally  not 
possible  to switch  to  and  from  a  shift system  because  of the 
attitudes of the  workforce.  The  size of the shifts  (that is, 
numbers  employed  on  each shift)  can  be  varied,  depending  on 
the extent to which  they are  compatible with  required  work-
group organisation,  but  in  general the  length of shifts are 
fixed,  with  the  exception of the  day shift. 
Moat  of the  overtime  found  among  firms  operating shift 
systems  appears  to  be  for maintenance  and  repair of machinery, 
although  overtime  may  occur  among  warehouse  and  dispatch 
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personnel.  In  Engineering,  for  example,  there is considerable 
need  for machine  maintenance  and,  even  in small firma,  this 
together with  tool setting tends  ta  be  undertaken  as  overtime. 
Overtime,  therefore,  may  well  be  a  much  leas flexible  instrument 
among  large and  medium  firms,  and  hence  in practice operates 
as  an  extra  degree  of flexibility in small  firms  and  those 
bearing a  disproportionate  share of market  variations. 
There is a  considerable  amount  of empirical work  on  over-
time  in aggregate  - see,  for  example,  Peterson  (1978)  and 
Coutts,  Godley  and  Nordhaua  (1978).  These  analyses  show  a 
cyclical sensitivity, albeit generally rather weak,  and·  a 
compensation for  a  1  hour  reduction in  normal  hours  by  an 
additional f  hour  overtime.  Overtime  therefore is nat 
entirely an  unrestricted instrument of the  employer&  it enters 
into the  wage  bargain where  that ia baaed  on  weekly  earnings. 
Furthermore,  overtime may  be  a  function  of the  level of 
technology  employed.  There  are substantial differences  in 
the  amount  of overtime in different industries which  are 
presumed  to reflect differences  in technical processes.  Thus 
changes  in technology may  change  the required  amount  of over-
time,  either less because  of mare  automation  or more  because 
of greater comp+exity.  But  the  relationship between  invest-
ment  and  overtime is ambiguous  for  an  additional reason. 
Above,  we  have  picked  on  an  ambiguity for  new  investment:  it 
is quite likely that a  reduction  in  replacement  investment 
may  lead to a  rise in overtime despite  a  decline in demand 
because  of an  additional need  fmr  maintenance  and  repair. 
Thus,  overall there is no  clear relationship between - 4~ -
technological change,  investment  or the  variations  in  demand 
and  variations  in overtime.  It is,  however,  fairly clear that 
it provides  a  greater degree  of flexibility in the  secondary 
than  in  the  primary sector. 
a.  Differences  between  manufacturing,  privata services end 
the  public sector1 
The  foregoing  discussion  on  the flexibility of  labour 
costa,  and  to  a  lesser extent the effect of  product  market 
changes,  has  been  given  mainly  in  terms  of  the manufacturing 
sector.  It is  now  necessary  to  broaden  the discussion  to  en-
compass  the  private service sector and  the  public sector.  This 
we  shall do  in  a  rather circumspect  way  since  such  an  extension 
of the  debate  raises  a  number  of major theoretical debates; 
however,  it seems  better as  an  approach  than  the  conventional 
one  of assuming. (asserting?)  that the  model,  pragmatically 
defined  for  the manufacturing sector,  is equally applicable 
to the  economy  as  a  whole. 
a)  The  public sector: 
In  the service sector,  either public  or private,  measured 
productivity change  is dependent  on  a  measure  of output  which 
in  general  does  not  reflect variation in  the  quality of service. 
Indeed,  in  the  public  sector,  output is measured  in  terms  of 
a  constant price real wage  bill,  that is in direct refation 
to labour  input.  The  growth  of public sector services is a 
function  of the ability of the  public sector to appropriate 
resources whilst meeting  certain monetary  and  balance of 
( 
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payments  targets.  The  precise  way  in  which  expenditure is 
varied  depends  more  on  the  economic  philosophy of  the  govern-
ment  than  on  the  needs  and  improvement  of social infrastructure. 
Thus,  in  the current  UK  climate,  the  emphasis  is on  cash  limits, 
forcing  a  choice  between  employment  and  income.  But,  in 
general in  the  post  war  period,  the fact  that expenditure 
policy  has  not  been  related directly and  uniquely to  a  measured 
need  means  that the  quality of service has  varied substantially. 
Whatever  policy is adopted  towards  expenditure,  howevei, 
a  demand  for  labour services is created  which  can  be  accommodated 
by  specific  groups  within  the  labour  force.  Expansion  of the 
armed  forces  creates  a  demand  for  young  men  in  a  period  of 
their life when  they  would  normally  be  training for  private 
sector  employment.  Expansion  of  the  health service either 
absorbs  young  unmarried  women  as  nurses  or older,  frequently 
married,  women  as  part-time  employees  on  social welfare  work. 
Expansion  of  the  education sector required  special training 
and  hence  reduced  future  mobility of prospective  employees. 
And  expansion  of  the  administrative  and  executive  grades 
absorbs  potential executives  and  clerical employees  from  the 
private sector market  ~nd, it is argued,  locks  them  into  a 
career  structu~e in  the  public  sector. 
Therefore,  substantial changes  in  recruitment  by  the  public 
sector will greatly affect the availability of certain types 
of labour  (particularly young  ones)  to  the  private sector if 
the  public sector is able  to  establish  a  prior claim  or to 
offer more  attractive employment  conditions.  On  average,  public 
sector employment  is more  secure,  for  both  full-time  and  part-time  employees,  than  private sector employment.  For part-
time  employees,  the  earnings  are  probably  higher in  the  public 
sector because  of the  greater degree  of union  organisation  and 
recognition,  and  the  wider  application of collective agreements. 
But,  for  full-time  employees,  public  sector earnings  may  well 
be  lower  although  varying significantly with  the  product  market 
conditions in manufacturing  insofar as  that contributes  to 
earnings  in manufacturing:  see  Tarling  and  Wilkinson  (1979) 
for  a  discussion  of changes  in the  public sector/private sector 
earnings differential.  On  balance,  there is probably  always 
excess  supply of part-time labour to  the  public sector but 
only  excess  supply of full-time  labour during  recessions. 
Thus  the  public sector can  pre-empt  supplies  of part-time 
labour  (as  happened  during  the  expansion  of health  and  educ-
ation in  the  early 1970s)  but  is likely' to  face  recruitment 
problema  for full-time  employees  when  private sector  jobs 
are available  (as  evidenced  by  shortages of teachers  and 
police in  the 1960s). 
b)  The  private service sector: 
Kaldor  (1966)  has  expressed  the  view  that  a  substantial 
proportion of  employment  in the  service sector should  be 
treated  as  overhead  labour.  This  view  clearly excludes 
occupations  such  as  window-cleaning  where  labour input is 
direct  and  where  demand  is  income  elastic and  price is market 
determined.  Since  price effectively equates  to earnings,  the 
supply of labour to  these  occupations  may  also  be  market 
determined. 
The  Kaldor  view  of the service sector postulates  imperfect 
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competition with  barriers  to  entry  and  a  price which  is a 
mark-up  on  the  wholesale  price of  goods  which  are  inputs  to 
the  service industry  (the  theory is best  read  as  applicable 
to  the  retailing sector but  does  have  a  wider applicability). 
The  gross  mark-up  on  wholesale  price,  together with  the  th~ough-
put of  goods,  creates a  gross  margin  out of which  labour  costa 
and  other operating costs are  to  be  met.  This  mark-up  can  be 
easily shown  to  be  a  simple  function  of the  income  elasticity 
of demand  (Cripps  and  Tarling  (1975)).  In  this sense,  labour 
is an  overhead  and  the  volume  of labour  input  depends  on  the 
throughput  of  demand  and  on  average  wage  costs.  In  particular, 
variations in  wage  costs  per unit of  labour  input are  accommodated, 
ceteris paribus,  by  variations  in  the  quality of service. 
The  difference  between  this view of the service sector and 
the  view of the manufacturing sector is the  absence  of  any 
technological  complementarity  betwBm the  level of activity and 
the  demand  for ·labour services  over  a  wide  range  of variation. 
In  the  absence  of changes  in  the  relationship  between  unit 
wage  cost  and  price,  variations  in  throughput  lead directly, 
to variations  in  the  amount  of labour input.  Throughput  tends 
to  vary  positively with  manufacturing  production,  although 
its more  direct relationship  to  consumers'  expenditure  means 
that much  of the cyclical variation is damped  by  savings 
behaviour  and  by  sales of  imports  of finished  goods~ 
It is now  of crucial importance  to  explain  the  determin-
ation of  wage  cost  per unit of labour  input  in the service 
sector since this will contribute significantly to  the  demand 
for  labour input.  ·In Tarling  and  Wilkinson  (1979),  we  have 
'  l 
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explained  the  importance of real wage  resistance as  the major 
factor  in national  bargaining.  To  the  extent that  there are 
collective bargaining agreements,  most  of which  in fact  are 
statutory wage  council orders,  wage  rates will tend  to  move 
in line with  the  cost of living.  But  real wage  increases 
should  impose  a  squeeze  on  labour  in the  service sector unless 
collective agreements  are  not  widely  enforced,  are  not  operative, 
or cheaper  labour units  are available.  Thus  the  volume  of 
labour  input should  vary  positively with  demand  for  the  services 
but  inversely with  the  rate of increase of real earnings.  The 
exception to this is where  marginal  increments  in  labour  input 
can  be  obtained at lower  unit rates.  Hence,  in  general,  and 
especially if competition  between  services  depends  on  the 
quality of service,  the  service sector·aS  a  whole will con-
tinually be  seeking  to  employ  increasing  numbers  of  low  cost 
labour.  When  the  manufacturing  sector is expanding,  its demand 
for  these  low  cost  groups  of  labour is unlikely  to rise,  but 
in recession  both  manufacturing  and  service sectora.will be 
•eeking  to  emplo~ low  coat  labour.  Thua,  it ia  not  surprising 
that the  characteristics of  the  unemployed  in recesaione  are 
more  akin  to  those  of individuals  normally  employed  in  primary 
sector firms. 
It is however  important  to  remember  that the  primary/ 
secondary  sector distribution is essentially a  product  market 
one,  based  in large part on  market  control.  It does  not 
necessarily  imply  a  1  - 1  relationship with  a  similar division 
in  the labour market.  The  relative absence  of a  technologically 
determined skill in  the service sector may  be  adequate  to  explain 
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the  greater  preponderance  of  secondary  employment  conditions 
but  these  do  not  imply  an  absence  of primary  sector firms. 
A particularly important  example  is the retail food  trade  in 
which  the development  of supermarkets  (and  multiple  chain 
stores in other trades)  have  obtained  primary sector market 
control.  It is  possi~le that  the  greater opportunity  for 
union  organisation  has  increased  the  primary characteristics 
of  employment  but  there is no  evidence  of  a  major  switch away 
from  the  traditional sources  of labour  supply. 
c)  The  informal •ector: 
Because  of its very  nature,  there is little evidence  of 
the extent  and  nature  of the  informal sector.  Nevertheless, 
~t is recognised  to  be  of  growing  importance  in most  European 
economies.  Its principal characteristics are  the  absence  of 
recorded  transactions,  avoidance  of tax  and  social security 
payments,  and  labour  used  where  possible  on  a  piece-rate 
subcontracting arrangement.  Such  activities in  the  construction 
and  miscellaneous  service sectors are well  known  and  have  been 
known  for  many  years.  In  general,  they  have  been  seen  as 
'moonlighting':  that is,  a  second  job  undertaken  as  a  supple-
mentary activity outside  normal  working  hours  or  even  in 
addition  to  drawing  social security benefits.  But  the  belief 
during  the current  recession is that  a  large  number  of  people 
are  involved  now  on  a  full-time  basis. 
To  some  extent,  the  development  was  explicable as  a  con-
i@qY@nQ@  Qf  fYll  e.•p,l.Q~m~nt,  E•~n t••k waa  an  individual 
agreement  and  generally involved  the  negotiation of  a  price 
for  each  new  task.  Thia  small unit activity rarely. attracted - so  -
much  attention except  when  it became  observable  in  a  decline 
in administrative  recorda.  This  was,  for  example,  the case 
in construction where,  mainly  as  a  result of the Selective 
Employment  Tax,  there was  a  sudden  surge  in labour only sub• 
contracting which  the  Government  sought  to control  thro~gh 
legislative means. 
But  recent  developments  appear  to differ in  two  major 
respects:  labour is organised  into workgroups  and  the 
activities are  in direct competition with  recorded activities. 
On  this scale,  it is difficult to discriminate  between  such 
activity and  the  more  traditional activities of hamewarking, 
outworking,  sweatshops  and  subcontracting.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that the  informal sector is simply  an  extension of 
secondary  employment  conditione  and  that this extension is 
to  be  found  not  only in service industries but also in the 
manufacturing sector  (this is known  to  be  the  case  in  Italy: 
see,  for  example,  Bruno  (1979)).  The  employment  conditions 
may  be  somewhat  worse  than  for  employment  in  recorded activities 
but this  can  largely be  accounted  for as  the  risk  borne  by, 
taking  the activity underground. 
The  avoidance  of ·tax  and  social security payments is 
likely to give.rise to higher  take-home  pay  for  the  employee 
(perhaps  describable  aa  containing a  risk  premium?)  and  lower 
unit labour costs to  the  employer.  The  fact  that  gross  unit 
labour costa are  lower  than  for  recorded activities means 
that  employers  do  not necessarily seek  even  lower wage  coat 
groupa  of employees  in the  informal sector.  In practice. 
they will be  in direct competition with  employers  in the 
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formal  sector for  the  traditional low  cost  groups  and  may 
even  be  able  to  draw  on  groups  higher  up  the  hierarchy of 
the  employment  structure. 
The  extension  of  the  secondary sector by  the  informal 
sector does  not  therefore necessarily  imply  any  new  sources 
of low  cost·labour.  The  lower  cost is achieved  by  avoidance 
of costa  borne  in  the  formal  sector and  not  through  lower 
wages.  Whether  the  growth  of  the  informal sector is in 
addition  to  the  existing formal  sector with  secondary  employ~ 
ment  conditions  or simply  ~art of it going  'underground'  is 
not  known:  that is,  we  do' not  know  if. the  demand  far  law  cost 
labour is increasing faster or nat.  Nor  is there  any  evidence 
an  the  origins of  the  informal sector:  are  primary sector firms 
involved  or is it simply  the  result of  employees'  individual 
choices?  Whatever its origins,  the motive  is clearly lower 
and  more  flexible  unit labour cost and,  once  in  existence, 
it is difficult to  believe  that  those  with  sufficient control 
over  their activities will have  enough  risk-aversion  to  revert 
to  the  formal  sector when  market  conditions  improve.  It is 
not  necessarily the  case either that  employees  are insufficiently 
compensated at present for  the  risks and  insecurity of working· 
in the  informal sector. 
9.  The  supelv of labour: 
The  traditional view  of labour supply is that labour  has 
a  supply price.  The  foregoing  sections  have  argued  that the 
demand  price for  labour is reflected· by  average  unit  labour - 52  -
costa,  not  by  wage  rates.  But  we  must  now  decide  whether 
those  wage  rates  can  in any  sense  be  seen  as  the  supply  price 
of labour:  that is, whether  the  segments  of the  labour market 
are  created and  cemented  by  demand  factors  or  employer 
strategies only. 
The  neoclassical version  essentially begins  with  the 
view  that individuals have  a  utility function  through  which 
they  trade  leisure for  income.  Human  capital theory  adds 
new  dimensions  but  the  philosophy  remains  the  same.  On  the  · 
other hand,  there is the  Marxist  view  of the  reserve  army, 
of  jobs  and  the  homogenisation  of labour. 
In  a  study of wage  deter~ination (Tarling  and  Wilkinson 
(1979)),  it is proposed  that real wage  resistance  provides  a 
\ 
floor  to  wage  increasest  thus  real wage  resistance can  be  said 
to reflect the  increase in  the  supply  price of labour already 
employed.  But it neither sets the  absolute  supply price of 
the  employed  (except  in  an  historical sense)  nor  does it 
provide  any  indication of the  supply price of the  unemploy~d 
and  new  entrants. 
Primary conditions of  employment  provide  for  the  employee 
some  security of  employment  and  potential mobility along 
promotion  lines which  have  associated with  them  a  wage  hier-
archy.  For this  reason,  we·could  characterise these wage 
hierarchies  by  the  wages  at the  ports of entry:  this is not 
wholly satisfactory since differentials  do  change.  To  the 
extent that these hierarchies  (at least the  bottom  level) 
are  the  outcome  af collective bargaining,  the floar  to  \ 
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increases is  given  by  real wage  resistance.  Above  the  lowest 
level,  expectations of  promotion  and  the  acquisition of  employ-
ment-related  benefits  (including  wage  differentials)  form  the 
aspirations of  employees  and  presumably  determine  the  supply 
price of labour  (in  a  wider  sense). 
Secondary  employment  conditions  do  not  include  these 
benefits  and  in  general aspirations of wage  change  are  formed 
without  regard  to  the current  job.  Improvements  in rates of 
pay  are  to  be  achieved  by  mobility rather  than  intra-firm 
promotion  and  with  aspirations  being  determined  by  potential 
access  to  jobs  with  primary  employment  conditions. 
The  supply  price of labour  thus  differs under  the  two 
conditions  and,  given  collective bargaining and/or minimum 
wage  legislation which  reflects real wage  resistance,  the 
difference  should  generate  greater mobility  among.secondary 
sector employees  than  among  primary sector employees.  It 
would  seem  on  this argument  that  the rete at which  aspirations 
are fulfilled  (and  revised  upwards)  will  be  a  function  of  job 
opportunities in  the  secondary sector and  of successful 
collective bargaining  (such  as  under  favourable  product  market 
conditions)  in  the  primary sector. 
The  intere~ting question  is what  happens  when  real wages 
are  cut  and/or differentials are  squeezed  in  the  primary sector 
or when  there is a  shortage of secondary sector jobs  so  that 
aspirations cannot  be  met.  Of  course,  someone  will be  un-
employed  - but  the  question is whether  that  unemployment  will 
(in  the  sense of  a  well-defined  supply price)  be  voluntary. 
The  alternative is that aspirations are  revised  downwards,  in - 54  -
which  case  the  underlying  role of  a  supply  price is of  littl~ 
operational use.  We  have  couched  the  argument  this way  round 
because  a  situation of  expanding  job opportunities  does  not 
provide  a  test of  the  supply  price:  it is perfectly rational 
for  individuals  to  seek  to  improve  their lot.  It ia  in  a 
situation when  earnings fall below  the supply price that  we 
have  a  teat. 
The  evidence,  such  as it is,  would  suggest  relatively 
little voluntary  unemployment,  and  relatively little voluntary 
mobility when  the  pressure of demand  fal1s1 •  In  the literature, 
there  are  explanations for this.  The  analysis  presented  above 
is a  short-period  one:  by  allowing  individuals to  look  beyond 
a  single period,  and  thus  widening  the  concept  of  a  supply 
price to  be  a  flow  of incomes,  the  absence  of voluntary mobility 
when  short-period  aspirations  cannot  be  met  is no  longer  a 
puzzle.  But  the  post-war  period  hardly  provides  the  conditione 
required  for  a  test of the  supply price hypothesis.  Recently 
there  have  been  decreases  in  real wages  and  these  have  not 
generated  additional voluntary mobility  (perhaps  because  of 
rank  and  file acquiescence  to  incomes  policy targets). 
This  discussion  of the  supply price of  labour  for  the 
employed  (which  applies  equally to  the  unemployed)  argues 
that  a  well-defined  supply  price does  not  exist:  as  long  as 
aspirations are  flexible and·the  rational choice  of  employ-
ment  rather  than  unemployment  dominates,  the  supply of  labour 
does  not  decrease  for  economic  reasons,  although it might 
1.  Tarling  (1978):  note  that  benefit-induced voluntary un-
employment  is again  rational with  the  benefit level 
providing  a  floor  to the  supply price. 
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well  do  so  for  social,  institutional or  demographic  reasons. 
There  are  three  categories of  the.employed  for  whom  the 
above  conclusion  may  not  hold.  These  are  potential migrants, 
either from  the  indigenous  population or  recent  in-migrants, 
near/post  retirement  employees,  and  married  women.  Potential 
migrants  do  not  necessarily  have  to  reduce  their aspirations 
because  of current  domestic  employment  conditions:  employees 
with  alternative  incomes  (pensions  or  household  income)  may 
decide  that,  at current rates of remuneration,  the  net  benefits 
from  employment  are  very  limited. 
All three  categories  have  a  supply  price determined  by 
alternative  incomes.  If,  however,  external conditions  are 
not  attractive  to  potential migrants,  it is unlikely that  they 
will behave  any  different  from  the rest of the  workforce.  But 
the  other  two  groups,  people  over  pensionable  age.  and  married 
women,  may  simply  be  in  employment  to  earn  'pin money':  that 
is,  they  make  rational decisions  about  employment.  However, 
for all three categories,  a  definition of  the  potential labour 
force  (possibly conditional on  the  supply  price)  would  incl~de 
these  groups  so  that  they  should  conceptually  be  regarded  as 
economically active  in a  complete  set of  demographic  accounts. 
The  major  ~lass of  new  entry is  young  people,  nearly all 
of whom  are  the  output  of  the  different levels of  the  educational 
system.  To  them,  we  might  add  older women  entering  the  labour 
force  for  the first  time  - although  most  labour  force  entry of 
older women  is  by  married  women  who  worked  prior to marriage 
or the first or  subsequent  confinements.  A household  decision 
model  ie  generally used  to  allow deferred  labour market  entry 
I-for married  women  and  hence  for  them  a  supply  price is assumed 
to exist.  But  for  single women  and  men,  each  age  cohort  beyond 
the  maximum  age  of  compulsory  education  can  be  almost  totally 
covered  by  the  options  of  employment,  unemployment  and  further 
full-time  education1,  ao  that the  existence of a  supply price 
does  nat  defer entry. 
A supply price  for  new  entry  (leaving aside  one  supported 
by  alternative activity)  is assumed  to  govern  the  point of 
entry into  employment.  Human  capital theory  has  made  the  major 
contribution here  but  the  introduction of screening  by  employers 
using  education qualifications,  especially as  an  instrument for 
varying  the levels of recruitment,  leads  to  consideration of 
the  response  of potential recruits.  Again,  we  need  to  look at 
periods of relatively limited  job opportunities.  In  the  UK, 
at least,  there is quite  a  lot of evidence  of applicants 
(especially with  good  educational qualifications)  lowering 
their aspirations  (dropping  their supply  price?)  and  taking 
lesser jobs.  Furthermore,  the  proportion of  new  entry  going 
to services relative to manufacturing varies counter-cyclically: 
for  a  constant distribution of applicants  by  educational standard, 
there must  be  some  flexibility in aspirations. 
The  main  ev~dence against  the  notion of  a  supply price, 
or  a  hierarchy of  supply prices,  is downward  mobility within 
the  employment  hierarchy  whe~ aspirations for  earnings or  joba 
are not  met.  Despite  the  explanation of  segmentation offered 
by  human  capital theory,  only  a  description· of the cross-
1·.  only about  95~ for woman  in  the  age  range  16-19. 
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section of  employment  can  be  achieved  and  upward  mobility chaine 
drawn.  There is no  mechanism  for  downward  mobility other  than 
a  fall in  supply price and  the  theory is very  much  weakened  by 
the  empirical observation that large  numbers  of the  low  paid 
are squally productive  and  frequently  as  highly skilled as 
large  numbers  of higher paid  employees. 
Thus  there  seems  to  be  no  sense in asserting  supply prices 
for  labour without  reference  to  a  theory of  pay  and  to  the 
social origins  and  values  of members  of  the  labour force, 
because  the  evidence  points  towards  flexible  supply prices. 
By  a  theory of  pay is meant  a  theory determining rates of  pay 
for different  jobs  and  the  changes  in  those  rates  through  time. 
Collective bargaining,  strikes and  other  forms  of collective 
action are  frequently discussed  as if they  were little more 
than  overt demonstrations  of the  supply  prices of  the. 
participants.  However,  the  origins of collective action 
(mainly  to  be  found  in  the  nineteenth  century)  would  ascribe 
a  greater role to  the  protection of the  membership  against 
exploitation and  the  vicissitudes of market  variations,  r~ther 
than  a  maintained  pressure to obtain or hold  to  a  gradually 
increasing supply  price. 
But  the  ~ttempts at unionisation  and,  in particular, 
attempts  to  gain  some  worker  control over  pay  pre-1914  were 
I 
relatively unsuccessful.  The  substantial variations in  market 
demand,·  which  frequently  led  to substantial movements  in  both 
directions of product  prices,  frequently  caused  real wages  to 
decline and,  indeed,  the fairly common  linking of wage  rates 
to  product prices  (particularly in larger establishments)  gave - 58  -
rise to  some  large falls in nominal  wages  as well.  Employers 
managed  to contain  the  growing  opposition  to this balance  of 
power,  particularly after a  number  of judicial cases  in defence 
of their position.  It is not  clear that  the  growing  opposition 
had  much  to do  with  increasing aspiration:  the  timing of con-
flict is more  explicable in relation to  perceived  shares  of 
the  burden  of recessions.  However,  through  the late nineteenth 
century,  the  terms  of trade  were  improving,  with  the  price of 
food  falling relative to  prices of manufactures.  This  tended 
tB  und8rmins  th8  suppart  for  union  partioip8t!on,  culminating 
in  the  Taff  Vale  judgment  just after the  turn of the  century; 
the  reversal  came  after the  early 1900s  when  the  terms  of trade 
deteriorated  and  raw  material prices accelerated with  the  advent 
of war.  The  consequence  was  sustained opposition  and  the 
emergence  of national collective bargaining. 
Thus  major  changes  in institutional arrangements  for  the 
determination of  pay  arose  as  a  result of the threat to  real 
wage  levels,  not  real wage  aspiration targets.  National 
collective bargaining was  consolidated  during  the  struggles  . 
of  the  early 1920s  and  remained  throughout  the  inter-war 
period  to fix  sliding  sc~le lists relating wage  rates  to 
product  prices.  .The  immediate  post-war  period  began  with 
the  commodity  price  explosion  during  the  Korean  War  boom  but, 
from  then  until the  mid  to late 1960s,  the  terms  of trade 
moved  in  favour  of industrialists.  The  sliding scales for 
wages  together with  the  growth  of wages  relative to  commodity 
prices  generalised  the  swing  towards  administered prices  which 
had  begun  (e.g.  in Steel)  during  the  1930s.  Thus  national 
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agreements  effectively achieved  compensation  for  coat  of living 
changes  even if still tying  wages  to  own  product  prices. 
The  growth  of real national  income  in the  post-war  period 
was  very  much  based  on  the success of manufacturing  in  the 
1950s.  Administered  prices left employers  somewhat  less 
concerned  about  wage  rates  and  that provided  an  environment 
in which  collective bargaining  could  develop  with  national 
bargaining  becoming  increasingly redundant.  Thus,  we  find 
the  growth  of plant level bargaining creating workplace  margins 
over national minimum.rates,  and  its logical extension  to 
company  bargaining  and  productivity bargaining totally re-
placing national bargaining.  But  the  1970s  have  posed  a  new 
threat to  real  incomes  and  that  has  seen  a  swing  back  to 
support  for national voluntary collective bargaining. 
It is evident  therefore that real wage  resistance  does 
provide a floor  to  the  change  in the  supply  price of labour 
and  that this can  be  demonstrated historically in the  emergence 
and  cohesion of collective action.  But  the  most  important 
question is whether  the  emergence  of decentralised  bargain~ng 
is a  reflection of  growing  aspirations  (or rising supply price) 
or not.  The  evidence of history suggests  not.  The  absence 
of cohesive  action,  the  bol~tering of real incomes  by  favour-
able  world  terms  of trade,  and  the  swing  away  from  decentralised 
bargaining  (and  return to real wage  resistance)  in  the  1970s 
would  suggest  simply that aspirations are flexible  upwards 
but  not  downwards. 
The  social values  which  underlie the collective action, 
particularly the militancy and  instltutionalisation of certain - 6D  -
methods  of  pay  determination,  do  undoubtedly  contain  rising 
aspiration levels through  time.  However,  there is no  direct 
evidence  that individuals  have  rising aspirations:  for  the 
explanation to  be  consistent, it is only  necessary that  they 
resist falls in real incomes.  Rising aspirations  can,  on  the 
other hand,  appear  on  an  inter-generational or cohort  basis. 
If there is in  any  sense  an  age-related  wage  structure,  even 
if only  an  experience related  job ladder for  the first 10 or 
15  years  of working life,  wages  may  increase  because  of pressure 
from  the  young  as  well as  being dragged  up  by  concessionary 
awards  gained  when  market  conditions are  favourable.  Ri~ing 
real wages  over  time  are  not  therefore proof of rising 
individual aspirations. 
Throughout  this discussion of  pay  determination,  we  have 
ignored  two  escape  valves.  One  way  in which  individuals  may 
maintain  their aspirations despite falling  real wages  is to 
lower their productivity or,  for  that matter,  engage  in more 
or less subtle  forms  of industrial sabotage.  However,  if the 
major  basis for  real wage  resistance is weekly  rather than 
hourly  pay,  employee  responses  of this nature  achieve  rather 
little except  as  a  form  or expression of militancy.  The  second 
escape  valve  ~s the  existence of  low  cost  labour,  whereby 
employers  can  continually shift the  burden  of adverse  market 
conditions  away  from  organised  labour  and  acquiesce  to  their 
real wage  resistance. 
This  is then  the  crux  to  the  question of the  supply  price 
of labour.  We  have  argued  that the resistance  to real wage 
declines is the  principal feature  of collective bargaining  and 
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as  such  can  be  operationally thought  of as  governing  movements 
in  an  individual's  supply price.  And,  historically, it is not 
evident  that this  has  been  substantially under  threat during 
the  twentieth  century.  Faced  by  employee  opposition  to  real 
wage  cuts,  employers  have  managed  to  find  ways  of adjusting 
unit labour costs  so  that they are  lower:  militancy arises 
during  the  adjustment  and  has  generally  been  resolved  on 
average  by  improved  market  conditions,  the  emergence  of  an 
alternative supply of low  coat  labour or  a  restructuring  of· 
production,  perhaps  facilitated  by  the  closure of one  factory 
and  the  opening  of another.  In  the  UK,  there is rather little 
evidence  of collective  action  having  been  defeated an£  the 
employers  advantage  sustained.  But  there are  examples  in  the 
US  (particularly in Steel:  see  Elbaum  and  Wilkinson  (1979)) 
and  in  Germany  where  such  changes  have  occurred.  But  generally 
competitiveness is maintained  not  by  lowering  individuals 
aspirations  but  rather  by  adjusting labour  input towards  lower 
cost units.  To  continue to  be  able  to  do  so  depends  on  the 
continuance  of supplies of labour willing to accept  lower 
rates of  pay  or to  work  in unorganised  sectors of industries. 
Thus  the continuation of the capitalist mode  of  production 
in  the  face  of collective action  based  on  real wage  resistance 
depends  either on  favourable  market  conditions or on  the ability 
of employers  to create and/or  reproduce  sources  of  low  cost 
labour or modes  of production with  lower  unit labour costs. 
Immigrant  labour  and  married  women  are  probably the  most  well 
known  source at present  but.both almost certainly have  a 
relatively short life span.  Existing  immigrant  groups  gradually 
I - 62  -
become  indigenised  and  social attitudes  have  moved  against 
substantial numbers  of  new  inflow.  Activity rates  among 
married  women  have  risen dramatically in  the  UK  in  the  post-
war  period  but  largely by  virtue of an  expansion  of  part-time 
.  b  t  •t.  1  JO  oppor  un1  1es  •  As  low  cost  labour,  full-time  employment 
of married  women  has  less possibility of survival because  of 
the  likelihood of  unionisation  (as,  for  example,  in  the  Jute 
industry)  and  there is very little room  for  continuing increases 
from  this  source  as  activity rates  rise to  the  demographic  llmit. 
Thus  the  continuation  depends  on  the ability of  the  small firm 
sectors,  present  in  nearly every  industry,  to survive.  But 
their survival must  depend  on  labour at similar rates of  pay 
to current relative rates.  Discussions  with  employers  in  small 
establishments  (see  Craig,  Rubery,  Tarling  and  Wilkinson  (1979}) 
have  revealed  some  disquiet  over  the  high  rates of  turnover 
among  the  young,  an  apparent  lack  of  commitment  to  work  or the 
firm  in  particular,  and  (they  claim)  an  increasing  dependence 
on  their older  employees  - now  more  readily  converted  to staff 
status.  However,  there  was  no  way  of checking  whether  thi~ 
was  a  new  and  growing  problem  in  the  post-war  period  or  an 
age-old  problem  facing·a  new  generation. 
Historical experience  suggests  that  small  firms  will 
continue  because  they  have,  because  labour  has  been  available 
and  because  market  conditions  favour  their development.  To 
what  extent  have  social values  changed,  or,  put  another  way, 
have  the  aspirations of younger  generations  begun  to  force  a 
1.  for  a  discussion  of cohort  and  demographic  effects,  see 
Tarling  and  Zighera  (1979)  and  Joshi,  Owen  and  Layard 
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squeeze  on  the  small  firm  sector?  The  one  piece of evidence 
which  suggests  that this is unlikely is that there currently 
exists  a  robust  small  firm  sector despite  the  post-war  rise 
in  real  incomes  and  the  fact  that  earnings  in  small  firms 
have  shown  no  apparent  tendency  to  lag  further  and  further 
behind  average  earnings.  Just as  with  proposed  minimum  wage 
legislation,  so  one  would  expect  rising wages  to  impose  a 
squeeze  on  small firms,  and  potentially  reduce  the  number  of 
firms.  The  real pressure  on  the sector  however  comes  duri~g 
expansions  when  real wages  rise  but  also  when  job opportunities 
are  increasing  and  new  small  firms  appearing~  The  explanation 
of  the  survival of  the  sector lies in its success at surviving 
and  indeed  capturing  market  share during  recessions,  this at 
a  time  when  primary  sector firms  are  facing  collective action 
for  real wage  protection. 
To  summarize,  a  supply  price may  be  said  to exist  for 
which  changes  are  induced  by  real wage  resistance.  Inter-
generational  growth  of real  income  aspirations  may  gradually 
reduce  the ability of  employers  to attract  low  cost  labou+, 
particularly as  traditional sources  are depleted  by  social 
attitudes.  But  small  firms  and  secondary  employment  conditions 
exist  by  virt~e of  product  market  conditions  as  well  as  labour 
market  conditions,  and  as  such  are  not  necessarily wholly dis-
advantaged  by  likely decreases  in  the  supplies of  new  low  coat 
labour.  The  maintenance  of secondary  employment  conditions 
has  undoubtedly  been  getting more  difficult during  the 
industrialization process  and  employers abilities to  reproduce 
low  cost  labour  more  restricted.  However,  the most  patent - 64  -
force  to  eliminate  secondary  employment  conditions  is fast 
growth  of  national  income  - and  nobody  will worry  too  much 
then.  Opportunities for  exploitation will continue  to  exist -
some  groups  of  labour  do  have  lower  'supply prices'  - and 
recession will in fact facilitate  the  recreation of secondary 
employment  conditions,  not  however  that this sector would  be 
expected  to  be  dynamically  competitive. 
10.  The  dynamics  of adjustment  in  the  labour market: 
Having  discussed  the  nature  of the  demand  for  labour  and 
the  supply of labour,  it is necessary  now  to  consider  the 
dynamics  of the  lab~ur market.  This  means  spelling out  in 
some  detail the  flows  in  the  labour  market  and  assigning 
probabilities  to  transitions  between  different labour market 
states. 
Let  us  consider first a  single firm.  Employers  face  a 
reduction  in  the  stock  of  employees  because  of deaths,  retire-
ments  and  emigrations  among  all employees,  and  because  of out-
flows  at marriage  and  confinement  for  women.  All  of  these 
outflows  are  reductions  in  the  supply of  labour  to  the  whole 
economy  as  we~l as  to  a  particular firm.  In  addition,  the 
employer  may  dismiss  certain  employees  for  disciplinary  reasons 
and  may  face  a  loss  through  voluntary quitting.  These  two 
flows,  however,  remain  in  the  labour force.  All of  these 
outflows,  with  the  exception  of voluntary quits,  will  be  more 
or leas  independent  of the state of  demand  in  the  labour 
market,  and  in order to maintain  his  stock of  employment  the l 
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employer  must  replace  these  employees.  Maintaining  the 
distinction as  ideal types  of  employment  in  primary  and 
secondary conditions,  we  would  expect  secondary  jobs  to  be 
filled  from  outside  the  firm  as  they  became  vacant  with 
relatively little internal promotion  but  primary  jobs  would 
frequently  be  filled  by  internal recruitment  for  promotion 
with  new  entry  coming  at or  near  the  bottom  of the  promotion 
ladder.  This  approach  to  primary  jobs  would  tend  to  deny 
the  inter-firm flows  at higher  rungs  of  the  promotion  ladder · 
if the  'internal labour market  structure'  is applied  too 
rigourously:  it is  now  generally accepted  that these  structures 
apply  to clusters of firms  with  external  inflow to  the cluster 
being  limited  to  the  lower  ranking  jobs.  Thus,  overall,  re-
placement  demand  is generally for  less  'well-qualified' 
applicants  than  the  employees  who  have left. 
The  employer  may  not  however  seek  to  replace in full 
these  departures.  If he  desires  to  reduce  his  stock  of 
employment,  he  may  choose  to  limit the  extent of  replacement 
and,  if necessary  (and,  these  days,  probably  as  a  last  r~sort), 
may  lay-off employees  or  make  redundancies.  If he  goes  this 
far,  he will increase the  stock  of employees  available  to 
other firms, .although  there  has  been  some  debate  during  the 
1970s  as  to  whether  redundancy  pay  and  social security payments 
(at least initially limited  to  these  involuntary outflows  only) 
may  lead  to  some  withdrawal of labour  (voluntary  unemployment) 
for  a  period  of  time  determined  by  the  benefits payable  relative 
to potential earnings  in  employment. 
Some  recruitment  for  replacing outflows  may  be  undertaken -'' -
by  a  firm  as  part of formal  training  schemes  which  they  operate. 
This  is more  likely to  be  a  characteristic of firms  offering 
primary  employment  conditions,  and  may  even· be  restricted to 
certain occupations.  For  other occupations  and  among  firms 
offering  jobs  with  secondary  employment  conditDns,  training 
will be  more  informal  and  on-the-job  where  the  training 
programme  is not  planned  in  advance  and  the  degree  of training 
varies with  the  experience  of  new  recruits.  Inflows  of 
trainees,  even  to  formal  schemes,  are  not  however  inde-pendent 
of the  state of  labour market:  the  evidence  of  the  1970s 
suggests  that this is one  way  of cutting  recruitment  levels 
and  one  of  the first options  taken. 
A desired  expansion  in  the  stock  of  employment  means 
that  a  firm  must  not  only  meet  its replacement  targets  but 
will also  be  seeking  to fill new  jobs.  As  with  vacancies 
created  by  outflows,  some  of the  new  jobs  (at least the  more 
desirable)  may  be  filled internally eo  that  vacancies  created 
by  new  jobs  may  be  on  average  lower  ranking  than  the  new  jobs 
themselves. 
The  sources  of  labour  from  which  a  firm  may  receive 
applicants for  any  vacancies  offered are  numerous  and  worth 
distinguishing.  From  within  the  labour  force,  new  recruits 
can  come  from  voluntary quits,  dismissals,  lay-offs  and 
redundancies  from  other firms,  from  employees  in occupations 
with  early retirement  (e.g.  the  armed  forces)  and  from  the 
unemployed.  Alternatively,  new  recruits  may  be  drawn  from 
new  entry into the  labour force,  comprising  leavers· from 
higher full-time  education,  school leavers,  married  women 
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re-entering  the  labour force  and  from  immigrants  (ex-patriot 
or otherwise). 
The  reasons  for  outflows  from  individual firms  and  the 
origins of  inflows  are  thus  numerous  and  we  must  now  extend 
the  analysis  to  consider  how  the  various  flows  resolve  them-
selves  as  net  changes  in  the  various  stocks  of total labour 
supply,  unemployment  and  employment  by  firms.  To  do  this,  we 
must  consider  how  each  employee  searches for  jobs  and  how  and 
when  he  chooses  to  make  an  application,  and  how  each  employer 
selects  new  recruits  from  among  applicants  for  each  jobo 
Before  doing  so,  w~ should  est~blish whether all of  the 
flows  may  be  occurring simultaneously and  whether mobility is 
limited.  One  of  the  major difficulties faced  by  all those 
who  have  attempted  to  model  labour market  flows  has  been  haw 
to deal  with  the  concept  of  gross  flows  as  an  aggregation 
over  many  firms,  each  behaving  in  a  different way.  One  of 
the first attempts  was  that of Holt  and  David  (1966)  in  an 
article published  in  conference  proceedings  entitled  'The 
concept  and  measurement  of  job  vacancies'.  More  recent 
attempts,  such  as  Wickens  (1974)  and  Tarling  (1979a),  have 
also  failed  to  resolve  the  question of  how  one  can  model  co-
existent  vacancies  and  redundancies.  In  these  papers,  it 
has  been  assumed  that  gross  vacancies ~  redundancies  can  be 
measured  as  the  desired  net  stock  change  plus  replacement 
recruitment.  But  this clearly nets  out all the  flows  generated 
by  the distribution of different firms  desired  net  stock  changes. 
There  is  however  no  reason  to  believe that this  gross  stock 
of  excluded  vacancies  would  remain  constant.  The  excluded element  would  be  zero if all firms  were  desiring  a  net  increase 
or  a  net  decrease  and  positive as  long  as  some  firma  desire  a 
net  increase  and  others  a  net  decrease.  In  general,  therefore, 
we  must  accept  that  vacancies  and  redundancies  co-exist  and 
that all the  flows  identified will  need  to  be  modelled. 
Although  we  are  not  concerned  in  this section with  the 
precise  way  in  which  a  model  would  be  defined  (that issue is 
discussed  in  part  D of the  paper),  it is necessary  to  resolve 
the  problem  of aggregation  over  firms  with  differing desired 
and  actual flows.  Given  the discussion of the  previous  sections, 
it would  be  a  retrograde  step to  choose  here  to  adopt  the 
representative firm  approach.  In  the  conventional  approach, 
vacancies  or  redundancies  are  defined  as  the  sum  of net desired 
stock  change  and  replacement  demand  (a  sum  which  will  be 
positive or negative),  with  each  firm  a  microcosm  of  the 
aggregate.  Using  a  ,simple  queue  concept  of  the  labour  market, 
enhanced  in  more  advanced  models  by  the distribution of  earninga, 
voluntary  quits  are  derived  as  a  function  of vacancies  and  a 
simultaneous  solution is found. 
There  are  three  ways  which  come  to mind  of  introducing 
the  missing  gross  element  of  vacancies.  Firstly,  they  could 
be  added  in  o~ the  right  hand  side of the  conventional  ex-
pression for  vacancies  by  making  them  a  function  of total 
conventionally defined  vacancies:  that is,  the larger is  the 
conventionally defined  vacancy  or  redundancy  total the  more 
likely it is that  the  co-existence of vacancies  and  redundancies 
will  be  limited  and  hence  the  smaller will be  the  excluded  stock 
of vacancies.  Second,  it would  be  possible  to assert that there - 69  -
was  a  fixed  distribution,  fixed  that is in  range,  of  vacancies 
or redundancies  across all firma  for  any  aggregate  level.  Both 
of these  are  simple  mappings  from  a  net  aggregate  to  a  dis-
tribution across  firms.  The  third  approach  is therefore  an 
explicit mapping  from  a  net  aggregate  to  a  range  of  individual 
firm  behaviour.  The  approach  which  we  shall adopt,  the  justific-
. 
ation for  which  will hopefully  become  clearer later,  is a  con-
bination of the  two  above.  Assuming  some  differentiation  between 
net  demands  for  labour  by  firms  in different product  marke~ 
conditions,  using  different methods  of labour market  adjustment 
and  offering alternative forms  of conditions  of  employment,  a 
differentiation which  may  vary  through  time,  we  can  impose  a 
fixed  distribution about  the  net overall figure  for  each 
differentiated  demand. 
The  question  of whether  or not  mobility is limited is 
one  which  has  challenged  economists  for  a  long  time.  Empirical 
investigation of the  degree  of mobility  between different 
occupations,  industries or  income  levels  has  often  in fact 
been  used  to establish the  existence of segmentation.  Most  . 
studies of occupational mobility  have  shown  quite  a  high  degree 
of mobility which  is not  restricted to specific clusters or 
systematically forming  chains  of mobility:  for  a  recent  study 
showing  this result,  see Metcalf and  Nickell  (1980)  using  data 
from  the  National  Training  Survey.  However,  there is more 
evidence of intra-cluster mobility using  an  industry claasific-
ation.  Using  data  from  National  Insurance  card  exchanges 
during  the  1960s,  Cripps  and  Tarling  (1972)  show  fairly well 
defined  industry mobility chains.  In  addition,  patterns of ------------------------··  -· .. _  ...  ,  ..  , .......  . 
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new  entry  among  15-17 year olds  in the  UK  are relatively stable 
by  industry suggesting  that  both  entry  and  progression are 
relatively determinate. 
The  apparent  inconsistency  probably lies in the  lack  of 
specificity in  the  definition of an  occupation  compared  to 
the  job content  and  skill requirements of an  industry classific-
ation.  Inter-occupational mobility may  be  substantial even 
within  a  firm  but  not  between  firms,  and  inter-industry mobility 
may  be  restricted to clusters  even  within specific occupations. 
Given  that this  paper  has  concentrated  on  product  markets, 
industrial structure and  derived  conditions  of  employment,  it 
seems  more  appropriate  to  view mobility  in  an  industry  rather 
than  occupational dimension,  and  thus  accept  limitations  on 
the  range  of mobility  such  as  clustering  by  industry  group 
and  probably also  by  conditions  of ·employment ·associated with 
different  jobs  in different firms.  The  question  which  we  must 
now  address ·is  how  far it is the  factors  determining  employee 
search  and  how  far it is those  affecting  employer  screening 
which  are creating these mobility chains  and  segmentation  in 
the  labour market. 
Apart  from  voluntary quits,  all other applicants  for  jobs 
do  not  currently hold  a  job  (although  they may  be  serving 
notice of dismissal or  redundancy)  and  hence  are free  to  search 
full-time  for  employment.  Jobs  are  advertised  in  a  variety of 
ways,  only  some  of  which  are  accessible to  every potential 
applicant.  Those  jobs  which  are advertised  through  the local 
employment  office or  job centre,  those  advertised  in the local 
press  and  those  indicated  by  signs  on  the  factory  gates are 
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readily accessible  for application  by  anyone  with  the  time  to 
find  out  that  they  exist.  But it is probably only  those 
advertised  on  factory  gates  that are difficult to  find  out 
about  for  voluntary quits.  Other  sources  of information  about 
job opportunities which  have  been  recognised  (see,  for  example, 
DE  Gazette  (1975))  include  workplace  and  union  contacts,  family 
contacts,  and  other social contacts,  the first of which  is 
mainly accessible  to  the  potential voluntary quit.  Thus 
employee  search  depends  on  the  distribution of vacancies  by 
source  of and  access  to  information.  The  leas vacancies  are 
concentrated  on  freely accessible sources  the  more  likely it 
is that the  bulk  of applications will come  from  voluntary 
quits. 
On  the  employee  aide,  we  can  identify frequency  of search 
and  access  to  information  about  vacancies  as  important factors. 
When  an  individual first becomes  unemployed,  there exists a 
stock of vacancies  which  he  may  be  able  to  consider but,  when 
that is exhausted,  he  must  rely on  the  flow  of  new  vacancies 
only.  Thus  the  probability of  an  individual finding  a  job 
depends  initially on  the  stock  to  which  he  has  access  and  his 
frequency  of search,  but it declines sharply when  the  rate at 
which  he  acquires  information  about  vacancies  becomes  limited 
by  the  flow  of  new  vacancies. 
The  vacancies  for  which  an  employee  may  choose  to  apply 
may  be  limited  by  access  to  information,  by  a  'reservation' 
wage  which  he  imposes  (or other  'reservation'  characteristics, 
such  as status of  job),  or by  his  perception of those for  which 
he  thinks  an  employer  may  find  him  suitable.  We  have  suggested - 72  -
above  that the  operation of  an  internal labour market,  either 
within  a  firm  or  between  a  cluster of firms,  may  lead  to 
vacancies  being  offered  for  'lower status'  jobs  than  those 
vacated.  Thus,  if employees  impose  or  face  a  'status floor', 
applicants  for  'lower status'  jobs  are  (cet.  par.)  likely to 
have  higher probabilities of finding  jobs  than  those  who 
vacated  high  status  jobs. 
Conventional  wisdom  supposes  quite  the  opposite.  Assuming 
that  individuals  are willing  to  accept  lower status  jobs  than 
the  one  they  vacated,  one  can  explain  why  unemployment  composition 
is biased  towards  the unskilled.  Whilst  such  is indeed  likely 
to  be  operative,  the  mechanism  suggested  above  would  offset it 
to  a  large extent.  Then  we  must  appeal  to other factors  to 
explain  the  composition  of  the  unemployment  stock.  This  we 
can  do  by  differentiating  between  the  method  of  job  search, 
the access  to  information  on  vacancies  and  the  reasons  for 
vacating  jobs.  Employees  in  high  status  jobs  are  more  ~ikely 
to  engage  in on-the-job search,  would  appear  to  have  wider  and 
better access  to  vacancies  and  are  less likely to  quit  j9be 
through  dissatisfaction or  to  be  dismissed. 
Segmentation,  or limitations  on  potential mobility,  can 
therefore  be.suggested  through  the  presence  of status floors 
(reservations}  and  access  to  information  of  vacancies. 
It is generally  supposed  that employers  screen  applicants 
through  their educational qualifications  and/or their employ-
ment  histories.  This  is equivalent  to  imposing  ceilings  on 
the status of vacancies  available  to different applicants. 
Apart  from  this,  there is relatively little that the  employer 
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can  do  other than  try to  influence  the  volume  and  'quality' 
of applicants.  To  achieve  this,  the  employer  may  widen  the 
channels  of outlet which  he  uses  to advertise  the  vacancies 
or redefine  the characteristics of  the  job,  such  as  increasing 
the  wage  rate.  The  extent to which  he  can  do  this is limited, 
not  only  because  of pre  and  post  entry closed  shops  but  also 
because  of  the  general  recognition of collective bargaining 
at least in  some  form  at local level. 
The  employer is clearly in  a  stronger position to  segment 
the  market:  he  defines  the  job vacancies,  selects the  channels 
of outlet and  screens  the applicants - all that  he  does  not 
control directly is the  volume  and  quality of applicants.  It 
is not  surprising therefore  that recent analysis  has  moved 
towards  the  view  that  jobs,  not units of labour,  are  segmented. 
Recent  theories of labour market  adjustment  which  highlight 
the  role of costs of adjustment  in determining  the flexibility 
of  employment  stocks  have  some  implications  for  employee  and 
employer  actions  described  above.  But  they  should  be  seen  as 
in addition to  them,  not  as alternative explanations.  R~tionally, 
such  costs would  be  expected  to affect decisions  mainly  in  the 
past  decade  or so.  They  may  well  explain  a  greater reluctance 
by  employees  ~o quit  voluntary and  a  greater willingness  to 
lower  their intensity of job  search  and  they  may  also  explain 
a  reluctance  by  employers ·to  hire or fire  employees.  At  the 
same  time  as  the  balance of  these coats shifts from  employee 
to  employer as  the  pressure of demand  varies,  employees  and 
employers  may  be  altering their strategies in the labour market, 
changing intensities of search,  varying  the  information channels - 74  -
used  or  the  level of discrimination or screening. 
11.  Segmentation  in  the  labour market: 
Segmentation  in this context is  then  caused  by  employers 
decisions  about  what  jobs  are  offered  (and  the  associated 
conditions  of  employment),  from  which  sources applicants  are 
sought  (internal or external)  and  what  kind  of screening is 
applied:  and  by  employees  who  become  locked  in  by  employment 
histories,  pushed  to  seek  advancement  on  external rather  than 
internal markets,  and  by  access  to  information.  Mobility 
chains  are  created  by  the  limitations  to mobility rather  than 
by  positive preferences for  the  chains  which  appear.  Voluntary 
quitting  from  a  firm  or  a  cluster of  firms  declines  as  the 
status of  the  job  increases  and. they  tend  to  create  jobs of 
an  increasingly relatively lower  status.  This  primary  market 
behaviour  is heavily conditioned  by  the  pressure of  demand, 
particularly in  the  product  market,  with  net  new  labour  demand 
and  replacement  demand  being  quite highly elastic to  the 
pressure  of  demand. 
This  shrinkage  of  primary  market  jobs  occurs  not  only 
absolutely but  also  relatively as  the  secondary  market 
opportunities,  whilst  also declining  as  a  direct  result  of  a 
decline  in  the  pre~sure of  demand,  are  not  so  elastic because 
of  the  switching  of  some  product  demand  away  from  the  primary 
market  as  primary  sector employers  attempt  to shift the  burden 
of riskG  Within  the  secondary  market,  however,  applicants 
per  job increase  as  some  displaced  primary  sector employees 
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join frustrated  potential  primary sector entrants  in  the 
competition  for  secondary  sector jobs.  Job  and  career en-
hancement  in  the  secondary  sector therefore  decrease  more 
rapidly than  in  the  primary  sectore  Voluntary quitting  may 
then  be  more  elastic  to  changes  in  the  pressure of  demand  in 
the  secondary sector,  despite  being  on  average  more  prevalent 
than  in  the  primary  sector. 
Thus,  primary sector employers  may  also  show  a  more 
elastic  response  in  the  number  of net  vacancies offered  a~ 
the  pressure of  demand  varies  and  secondary  sector  employees 
may  show  a  more  elastic response  in  their propensity  to  quit 
voluntarily.  The  consequence  of this is that  the  pressure 
of  demand  for  labour  (from  the  employers  point of  view)  falls 
more  rapidly in  the  primary  sector,  thus  increasing  the  down-
ward  tendency of secondary  sector voluntary  mobility.  Given 
an  exce~s demand  for  primary  sector  jobs  (a  high  pressure  of 
demand  from  the  employees  point  of  view),  this will  give  the 
impression  that  primary  sector behaviour  by  employees  is 
rational whilst  that  among  secondary sector  employees  mu't  at 
least in part  be  accounted  for  by  job dissatisfaction  and 
inherent  instability. 
While  it is almost  a  tautology  to  claim  that  secondary 
sector  jobs  have  the lees desirable conditions of  employment1 , 
it does  not  necessarily follow  that  the  origin  and  explanation 
of  segmentation  must  lie with  the  employees  and  their apparently 
higher  voluntary mobility.  The  discussion  of  the  whole  of this 
1.  not  quite,  since  there is not ·a  1-1  correspondence  between 
conditions of  employment  and  conditions  in  the  product 
market. - 1' -
part of the  paper  has  bean  aimed  at  showing  that  agents  (both 
employers  and  employees)  acting  rationally within  the  constrainte 
they  face  in  the  labour market,  constraints  caused  by  rational 
behaviour  on  the  part of other  agents,  can  create segmentation 
in  the  sense  of  limited mobility  and  an  apparent  correlation 
between  the  status of  jobs  and  the  qualifications of  those  who 
fill theme  It is  important  however  to  recognise  that  the  state-
ment  that  behaviour  is individually rational is not  necessarily 
equivalent  to  the  neo-classical  view  of  rational behaviour:· 
that  depends  on  the  motives  (maximanda  or minimands)  of  the 
agentso  The  theory  expressed  here  is also consistent with 
radical or  Marxian  view  of strategy  and  class conflict.  The 
evolution  and  actions  of  the  institutions  (trade  and  employers 
associations,  trade  unions  and  the  State)  are  as  much  a  part 
of  the  theory  as  the  behaviour  of the  individual  employers  end 
employees. 
12.  The  role of  BXB§
4ctations: 
The  difficulty in  modelling  a  theory  such  as  that  expressed 
above  is that it is in  general unsatisfactory to  assume  perfect 
foresight  at  ~he same  time  as  limited  information  in  the  current 
period.  Employers  expectations  of output  levels,  and  the  state 
of  the  labour  market  which  they  might  face,  will not  always 
prove  to  be.correct  and,  since  we  must  drop  the  assumption  of 
a  single  representative firm,  it must  be  supposed  that unfilled 
expectations are deatabilising in  the  sense  that contingent 
plans  by  other agents  are falsified.  The  particular emphasis 
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in  the  paper  has  been  on  the  conflict of interest between 
employers  and  employees  in  the  labour  market  and  we  have 
drawn  out  an  important  asymmetry  in  the  response  of  employers 
and  employees  to  changes  in  the  pressure of  demand.  But  great 
care  is needed  in  modelling  this  asymmetry  because it depends 
on  the  absence  of full  information  and  perfect foresight.  It 
is not  so  much  the  stochastic nature  of  the  process  suggested 
by  the  use  of probabilities - these  indeed  may  be  close  to 
identities - but  rather the  stochastic  process  of confronting 
expectations  and  reality and  the  consequent  distribution of 
behaviour  over  firms  facing  similar states of the world. 
Most  of  the  foregoing  discussion  has  avoided  the  issue 
of expectations  and  it is possible  (as  has  been  common  practice: 
see  Holt  and  David  (1966),  Wickens  (1974),  Tarling  (1979a)) to 
construct  the  model  without  recourse  to  expectations.  This, 
perhaps,  is  the first step  which  can  then  be  developed  by 
introducing  expectations  into the  model.  i  This  introduces  two 
major difficulties:  firstly,  the  analytic complexity of the 
model  increases  rapidly and,  secondly,  the  task of  estim~ting 
parameter  values  requires  some  of the  most  recent  econometric 
techniques. 
In  the final  part of  the  paper,  we  shall summarise  the 
a~~ume~t of this second  part  and  put  down  an  outline of  a 
model  incorporating  th~ principal ldsaa.  Where  appropriate. 
an  expectational  form  will  be  indicated.  But·some  limitation 
must  be  imposed  since it is desired  to  achieve  some  insight 
into  the  dynamics  of  the  labour market  (and  hence  the  model 
should  be  at least partially mathematically  tractable)  and - 7S  • 
to  provide  some  indications of  how  to  improve  econometric 
estimation of  employment  levels  and  changes  with  reference  to 
the  limitations of data availability,  particularly on  flows 
within  the  labour  market. 
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D.  A summary  and  mathematical representation of the  model 
13.  The  main  points of the  argument: 
Conventional short-run  employment  functions  are  derived  on 
the  assumption  of cost-minimising  behaviour  by  the  employer, 
with  a  passively responding  role assigned  to  employees.  The 
repeated  attempts  to  estimate  such  functions,  even  those  usin1 
some  of the moat  sophisticated  techniques  of econometrics,  have 
failed  to  provide  parameter  estimates which  have  remained  stable. 
The  main  criticisms  levelled at this. approach  are  the failure 
to define  in  a  precise way  employer  behaviour,  by  developing 
the  implications of cost-minimising  behaviour;  a  seeming  lack 
of  concern  for  the  implications  of using  a  single representative 
firm,  thereby  ignoring interactive  elements within  the  labour 
market  and  failing  to define  more  than  an  actual demand  for 
labour;  and,  finally,  a  failure  to  incorporate  the  dynamics  of 
labour market  segmentation  theory. 
Employers  face  a  market  where  demands  are  met  by  sale• to 
different buyers,  such  as distributors,  intermediate  producers 
and  final  buyers.  Cost-minimisation is achieved either by 
exerting  some  ~egree of control aver market  demands  or  by 
retaining control of unit  production  costs.  Market  control in 
the  long  run  depends  on  competitive  improvements  or losses 
through  technological  change  or foreign  competition  and  may 
be  gained  aggressively or defensively through  merger activity, 
but  in  the  short  run  employers  seek  to minimise  the risk  burden 
implicit in cyclical market  variations  by  increasing flexibility - 10  -
of unit  production costs or  by  use  of subcontracting arrange-
ments  to  reduce  the  variations  in  production  relative  to  demand. 
But  firms  may  find it rational,  with  relatively fixed  capital 
costs,  to  internalise unit labour costa for  a  number  of  reasons 
(see  Doerringer  and  Piore  (1971));  then  we  are likely to  see 
the  emergence  of  a  primary set of  producers  with  market  control 
and  a  relatively high  degree  of labour cost fixity. 
Remaining  employers  in  the  industry survive  by  having  labour 
cost flexibility  but  must  face  disproportionate variations in 
market  demand,  the  variations  in  demand  originating with  con-
sumers  being  compounded  by  the market  control of primary  producers. 
Thus  producers  for  each  product market  are  segmented  by 
their ability to control either their market  share  or their unit 
costs of  production:  the  segmentation is a  cumulative  process 
through  time,  which  responds  to  competitive factors  in the 
product market,  such  as  the  introduction of  new  technology, 
foreign  competition  and  merger activity,  and  which  is likely 
to  change  more  rapidly with  international expansion  or com-
petition than  when  the  trend  in  domestic  demand  alters or 
domestic  competitiveness shiftse 
A single  'represeritative'  firm  assumption  would  be  in-
appropriate  bec~use it would  ignore  this diversity of  behaviour. 
But,  when  allowing  a  multiplicity of firms,  we  must  introduce 
employers  associations into the analysis.  These  associations 
may  have  had  their origins either as  trade associations,  con-
cerned  primarily with  events  in  the  product  market,  or may 
have  recent origins,  set  up  as  a  part of a  framework  for 
industrial relations in the  industry,  at the minimum  aa  a - &1  -
counter-veiling  power  to trade  unionism.  The  operation of 
these associations  is governed  in large part  by  the  cohesion 
(or otherwise)  afforded  them  by  the  presence  (or absence)  of 
a  community  of interest.  Insofar as  they  seek  to exploit 
factors- of production  or consumers,  a  unity of interest may 
be  taken  for  granted  but this unity  is· easily shattered  by 
technological discovery or the  emergence  of  law cost  foreign 
competition.  Those  firms  which  have  effective control of the 
associations  may  be  able  to  increase their market  control 
through it or establish internal labour market  clusters of 
firms;  failure of the associations is generally associated 
with  greater product  and  labour market  competitiveness. 
It should  be  evident  by this point in  the discussion 
that the  economic  argument  based  on  cost-minimising  behaviour 
is mixing  the  economic  philosophies  of efficiency and· exploit-
ation.  Efficiency leads  to aggressive  product market  behaviour, 
through  technical  progress  and  organisation,  and  associated 
with,  in general,  internalised cost control.  Defensive  product 
market  behaviour requires relative exploitation of factors  pf 
production,  particularly labour,  and  is generally to  be 
associated with  the  creation of  secondary  employment  conditions. 
It should  be  no~ed,  however,  that there is not  a  1-1  relation-
ship  between  product  market  and  labour market  segmentation. 
Effective  product  market  control may  be  established  through 
the ability to create and/or retain secondary  conditions of 
employment:  secondary  producers  (facing substantial variability 
in demand)  may  nonetheless  provide  primary conditions of employ-
ment. 
.  ; - B2  • 
Duality· in the  labour market  has  become  popularised 
because  of the  apparent distinction to  be  drawn  between  price 
and  quantity adjustments,  the  former  in the  primary  sector and 
the latter in  the  secondary sectors.  But  this is  a  misplaced 
concept.  The  ability to  reduce  quantity adjustments  in  the 
primary market is based  on  product  market  control and,  to  the 
extent that quantity adjustments  take  place,  they are internalised 
as  much  as  possible.  The  main  distinction  then  between  primary 
and  secondary labour markets  is the  need  to  internalise or 
externalise labour cost adjustment.  At  least in  the  post-war 
period,  this is a  distinction  between  the  nature of quantity 
~adjustments of the  input of labour services in the  two  sectors, 
the  changes  in  the  wag~ fixing  process  having  greatly reduced 
the  potential for  labour cost flexibility  through  price  changes. 
furthermore,  duality in this  redefined  sense is a  characteristic 
one  would  expect  to  find  within  every  narrowly-defined  sector 
of the  economy  and  not  simply  between  the  manufacturing  and 
service sectors. 
The  ability of  employers  to  create  and  sustain  seconda~y 
conditions  of  employment  depends  on  the  sources  of the  supply 
of labour,  on  their individual values  and  actions,  and  on  their 
degree  of organisation.  Conventional  theory  would  ascribe to 
each  unit of labour  a  supply price:  note  the  misuse  of this 
concept  to  generate  theories·of voluntary  unemployment.  But 
individual behaviour  depends  on  their aspirations,  and  on 
whether  they  can  be  realised  internal or external to  the  'firm', 
that is within  an  internal labour cluster or externally through 
voluntary quitting and  engaging  in  job search.  The  answer  to l  : -
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the  existence of  a  supply price hinges  on  labour's  response 
to  a  £Y!  in real wages  below  the  aspiration level of wages. 
This  leads  to  the  conclusion that there is no  well-defined 
supply  price because  of apparent  flexible aspirations  and  the 
general  choice  of  employment  rather than  unemployment.  But 
we  must  then  back  up  this  theory with  a  theory of  pay  and 
social values. 
It is evident  however  that the  continuance of the capitalist 
mode  of  production  in the  face  of real wage  resistance,  and 
cohesive  labour  and  social militancy,  depends  on  the ability 
of  employers  to create and/or  reproduce  low  cost labour or 
modes  of  production with  lower  unit costs.  The  conventional 
sources  of  low  cost  labour  (migrants,  near or poet  retirement 
employees  and  married  women)  are  in diminishing  supply  but, 
if the definition of segmentation  given  above is correct,  do 
not  exhaust  the  sources of supply.  But,  even if we  include 
those  employees  locked  into  secondary  conditions of  employment  . 
by  their commitment  to  the  work  ethic or  by  the  paternalism 
of their employers,  changes  in social values  may  be  redu~ing 
the  secondary  sources  of  supply:  these  changes in social values 
may  take  place  without  the  expected  growth  in  employee  organis-
ati~n  throug~ a  spread  of trade  unionism. 
We  have  discussed  above  the  nature of the  demand  for 
labour and  of the  supply of labour,  and  the  role of organisation 
among  both  employers  and  employees.  We  turn  now  to  the  dynamics 
of the  adjustment  process.  Outflows  from  firms  are either 
voluntary or involuntary:  the latter are  either lay-offs or 
demographically  determined.  Inflows  are  to  replace  losses or - 84  -
to  make  net stock  changes.  Employers  have  the  choice of which 
jobs  to fill and  how  to fill them  (or indeed  whether  or  not  to 
make  redundancies)  and  can  employ  screening devices  in selection 
of applicants,  alternative channels  for attracting potential 
applicants  (different ways  of advertising  vacancies)  and  can 
redefine  the characteristics of the  job.  The  sources  of  labour 
from  which  they  can  recruit are  the  potential voluntary quits 
(who  are currently  employed),  the  unemployed  and  new  entry. 
These  empldyees  are differentiated  by  their frequency  of  sea~ch 
and  by  their access  to  information  on  new  vacancies.  Thus  most 
of the factors  which  constrain  the mobility  chains  of  employees 
lie in the  hands  of  the  employers:  it is not  necessary  to  appeal 
to  the characteristics of the  individual  employees.  Put  another 
way,  it is the  jobs  which  are  segmented  and  not  the  employees. 
Although  employees  may  place  a  lower  bound  on  the  probability 
of applying for,  and  accepting,  a  job  by  having  a  reservation 
set of conditions  of  employment,  it is the  employer  who 
principally can  control the  volume  of applicants  and  sets the 
upper'limit to  the  probability of successful application  fqr 
a  job. 
We  are  therefore arguing that segmentation is caused 
primarily  by  e~ployer actions,  although  employees  may  become 
locked  into  a  segment  by  his  own  employment  history  and  access 
to  information.  Mobility  chains  are  the  result of limitations 
to mobility rather than  the  outcome  of positive preferences  by 
employers.  This is reinforced  by  the  finding  (Cripps  and 
Tarling  (1972))  that there is substantial  two-way  mobility 
even  when  net flows  ere  quite large. 
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By  examining  in detail the  behaviour underlying  the  changes 
in  jobs  and  the potential mobility of  groups  of  employees,  it 
is possible to  conclude  that vacancies  in  the  primary  sector 
are  relatively elastic whereas  the  probability/of getting  a 
job ~nd voluntary  quitting)  are  more  elastic in  the  secondary 
sector,  and  a  principal cause  of this is the  fairly  permanent 
presence  of an  excess  supply of labour to  the  primary  sec~or. 
But it is important  to  recognise  that  the origins  and 
evolution of agent institutions and  institutionalised relation-
ships are  as  much  a  part of this theory as  the  predicated 
individual behaviour.  Without  that,  labour is reduced  to  a 
passively responding  role  by  the  apparent  primacy·of  employers 
motivations.  The  theory  can  be  complicated  by  introducing 
expectations  and  aspirations  wh~re appropriate,  both  for 
individuals .and  their institutional collectivity.  This  however 
is not  simply  a  problem  engendered  by  the  stochastic nature of 
individual response  (most  probabilities are  almost  identities) 
but rather a  problem  of aggregation  and  the  reconciliation ~f 
individual and  institutional behaviour when  all expectatipns 
cannot  be  jointly satisfie9. 
14.  An  outline of  the model: 
In  this section,  we  shall not  attempt  to  construct  a 
mathematically  tractable model.  The  intention is rather to 
set  down  in  a  more  rigorous  way  the  propositions  made  in  the 
previous  section.  It will then  be  possible  to  ascertain what 
factors  should  enter into the  explanation of aggregate  employment - eG  -
change  and  give  a  priori expectations  of  the  co-efficient 
origins  and  magnitudes.  The  discussion  which  follows  is in 
four  parts:  the first is concerned  with  employer  behaviour, 
the  second  with  employee  behaviour,  the  third with  organisation 
of  employers  and  employees  and  other aspects of aggregation, 
and  the  fourth  sets out  the  implications  for  empirical analysis 
of the  aggregates. 
(i)  employer  behaviour: 
Employers'  behaviour is  assumed  to  be  directed  towards 
cost minimisation  and  motivated  by  efficiency targets 
(aggressive  market  behaviour)  or  exploitation  (defensive 
market  behaviour).  Which  motivation is dominant  in  the  medium 
term  depends  in large  part  on  the  employer's  current and 
intended  market  control  and,  in  particular,  on  the  degree  and 
nature of  external competition  facing  him  either within  the 
domestic  market  or  from  abroad.  Thus  the  two  primary  factors 
which  concern  the  employer  are  his  planned  or anticipated 
production  levels  and  the  unit  labour costs  of that level ol 
production.  In  the  following  presentation,  we  shall assume 
that  the  pricing  policy adopted  is  a  markup  on  normal  cost, 
that  non-labour variable costs are  pioportionate to  labour 
cost  and  that productivity  per  man  hour  is measured  net of 
capital costs. 
Theo,for  a  single  firm,  we  can  write: 
where  subscript  k  = a  particular job 
Ek  = employment  in  job  k  ~­
'• .  .. 
l 
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Wk  =  weekly  earnings  in  job  k 
Hk  =  weekly  hours  worked  in  job  k 
and  Pk  = productivity  per  man  hour  in  job  k 
Weekly  earnings  are  a  complicated  function  of  hours  worked 
(overtime  and  shift work  included)  with  the  basic  hourly  rate 
given  a  floor  to ita level and  increase  by  collective bargaining 
and  supplemented  by  job-related bonuses.  Productivity  per  man 
hour is assumed  to  be  independent  of the  incumbent  of the  job 
and  to  depend  on  the  stock  of machinery of various  vintages: 
pk  =  C ~v e-rv  I -kv 
where  C is  a  constant,  v  = vintage,  r  = rate of  embodied 
technical  progress  and  I  k  = equipment  of vintage  v  used  in 
- v 
job  k.  This  provides  a  steady shift in the  technological 
frontier with  investment  levels measuring  the ·rate of 
implementation  of  new  technology. 
Planned  or anticipated  production  (Y)  is  governed  by 
market  control and  external  competition.  To  the  extent  that 
a  firm  has  a  competitive advantage,  in this model  through 
lower  unit  labour costs, it can  in  a  sense  exert  a  prior claim 
on  the  market  and  produce  to  planned  levels.  This  may  include 
increases  gained  by  innovating  (lowering  pr~ductivity by 
higher  investment  and  hence  lowering unit  labour costs)  or 
achieving  the  same  ends  by  merger  or rationalisation;  or it 
may  include  decreases  in  the  face  of  low  cost  competition. 
Thus  planned  output  levels will  be  a  major  factor  determining 
the  movement  of unit  labour costs. 
Given  a  planned  level of output,  a  firm  can  plan its - ss  -
unit labour  costs appropriate  to  that level of  output.  The 
notion  of  planning  introduces  the  need  for  a  medium  term  view 
so  that  recruitment  decisions  should  take  into  account  training 
requirements  and  potential firing  costs  (mainly  redundancy  pay). 
The  employer  seeks  to  minimise  the  chan~ in  his 
unit labour costa  necessary  to  meet  the  planned  level of output, 
not  only  in the  current  period  but  also  in  the  medium  term. 
Thus  an  employer  may  offer vacancies  or make  redundancies  on 
the  basis  of his  desired  (planned)  unit  labour  costs,  conditional 
on  his  planned  output  level. 
The  notion  of  a  planned  output  level is not,  in this  context. 
very  precise.  It is possible  to  conceive of  planned  unit labour 
costs  which,  for  a  given  stock  of  employees  (the  primary  unit 
of the  plan,  given  wages),  can  produce  a  range  of  output  levels 
by  varying  hours  worked  with  consequent  adjustments  to  unit 
labour costs.  Thus  a  planned  stock  of labour  associated  with 
a  planned  unit  labour cost  can  produce  a  range  of output  and 
hence  absorb  some  deviation  of actual  from  planned output 
without  further  adjustment  in  the  stock  of  employees. 
But  the  notion  of  a  planned activity  and  associated  input 
'  is very  much  tied to  the  idea  of market  control  and  is typical  ·I 
of the  prima~y sector firms  referred  to  in  previous  sections. 
It requires  the ability to  achieve  planned  levels  (more  or 
less)  even  though  the  total market  demand  may  vary.  With 
sufficient competitive  advantage,  this is possible,  but  without 
it we  move  towards  the  secondary  sector firm  which  competes 
in the  residual market  and  for  whom  planned  output levels 
are  much  less feasible:  their strategy is to  operate with 
flexible total labour costs to  meet  whatever  demand  they  may - &19  ... 
face,  much  of which  will be  unanticipated. 
It should  be  noted  here  that  the  expectation is that  the 
primary  sector firms  (primary,  that is, within  the  product 
market)• will generally  be  market  leaders in  the  mass  production 
segment  of the market,  either relatively large in size or of 
recent origin:  they will however  include smaller firms  who  are 
producing  for  the  quality  end  of the market  or in specialist 
products. 
The  market,  defined  for  the  purposes  of the  above,  is an 
international market  for  a  product  or a  protected  domestic 
market,  either behind  tariff barriers or  because  the  commodity 
or service is not  traded.  Competitive  advantage  depends  (in 
this  formulation)  on  unit labour costs of  production.  For 
most  products  the  competition is international:  the  more 
competitive  a  firm  is the  more  protected it is against short-
run  variations in  demand  (through its ability to  pass  costs 
forward  or  backward)  but  the  more  internalised  (fixed)  will 
be its labour costs  and  hence  the  greater will  be  the  eventual 
redundancy  and  closure  impact  of  a  collapse in  effective  demand 
or the  emergence  of  new  competition. 
Secondary sector firms  survive  by  their ability to  achieve 
flexibility in their unit labour costs  of  production,  particularly 
through  greater variations  in  the  stock  of labour.  Competition 
in the  product  market  is greater  and  thus  flexibility depends 
partly on  the  existence of a  supply of  low  cost labour,  which 
may  be  retained  as  overheads  when  demand  declines,  or a  supply 
of labour which  is either voluntarily more  mobile  (such  as 
married  women)  or  unorganised  in  the  sense  that they  can  be 
hired  and  fired  more  or less at will. - 90  -
Thus  demand  in  the  product  market  is met  by  two  types  of 
firms,  those  who  can  plan their output  and  those  who  cannot. 
Those  who  plan their output will also  plan  their employment 
input  and  will always  attempt  to  minimise  the  change  in unit 
labour costs.  But  those  who  cannot  plan  output levels are 
more  dependent  on  competing  with  relatively  low  unit  labour 
costs  and  hence  must  minimise  the levels of unit labour cost 
each  period,  necessarily resorting  to  greater variations in 
the stock  of employment.  Thus: 
"  "'  a)  Primary:  E  f  (Y 
p  Y_1)  subject  to  min 
"  "'  C(I,  R)  (uc  - uc_1 )  + 
where  C =  unit cost of hires  ( I )  and  redundancies 
b) 
I  ( y I) 
I  Secondary  E  =  f  subject  to  min  uc  •  s 
1\  I  ,, 
with  E  =  E  +  E  and  Y = y  +  y  • 
It is expec.ted  that  0  < f p
1  < f ;. 
(R). 
These  are  desired  demands  for  stocks  of  employees.  Each 
segment  must  also satisfy the  following  relationships:  · 
Outflow  F = Q +  R +  X 
where  Q =  VQluntary  quits into the  labour market, 
R = redundancies,  X = demographic  and  voluntary  departures 
from  the  labour force. 
'*'  Desired  inflow  I  =  desired  vacancies 
= max  [(E- (E_1 -f)),  0 J 
Redundancies  R  =min  [<E- (E_1- f)),~J 
,. 
I 
( 
I 
I 
t 
I 
I 
I 
•  1 
I 
i 
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where  1  )>  0  is  a  factor  to  represent  the  aggregation  over 
firms  and  hence  the  coexistence  of  vacancies  and  redundancies. 
(ii)  employee  behaviour: 
Employees  are  assumed  to  undertake  job  change  to  satisfy 
real wage  asp.+rations,  but  the  period  over  which  the  aspirations 
t~ 
are  relevan't~ay vary  from  the  next job  to  the  full  employment 
cycle  for  an  individual.  Thus  an  individual  has  in  mind  an 
earnings  profile over  his working  life which  may  be  truncated 
and  from  which  he  may  deviate  either  b~cause the  real wage  in 
his  current  job declines  relative  to aspiration or  because 
the  'next move'  is not  open  to  him.  These  earnings  profiles 
will  probably  have  attached  to  them  an  employment  profile in 
the  sense  of  a  career  progression  or  sequence  of  job moves 
which  will be  restricted in  occupational or industry  range. 
That is,  over  long  periods of  time,  there is an  expected 
pattern of  job  change  which  could  be  described  loosely as 
'career progressive':  in  the  short  period,  there may  be  job 
mobility  but  over  a  much  more  limited occupational or 
industrial range.  When  the  earnings  profile is truncated, 
as  would  be  the  case  for  employees  who  are  marginal  labour 
force  participants,  the  employment  profile will  be  similarly 
truncated  or' even  non-existent. 
The  above  formulation  of the  incentive  to  job mobility 
has  been  couched  entirely in  terms  of real  wages  (or  earnings). 
If it were  not  for  the  difficulty of measurement,  other 
attributes of  the  job  could  be  easily included  so  that  an 
earnings  profile is replaced  by  a  'job  package'  profile which 
includes  the  individual's valuation  (in  some  sense)  of all - 92  -
the attributes which  he  considers  relevant,  which  may  of 
course differ between  individuals,  and  the  trade\-'offs  that 
he  is  prepared  to  make.  Despite  a  fairly  extens~ve literature 
on  non-pecuniary attributes of  jobs,  very  littl~lan be  said 
other  than  that it is unlikely that  the  non-pecuniary 
attributes correlate with  earnings  (either  posi~~ely or 
negatively).  It will suffice for  this discussil·· that  jobs 
~ •'; 
can  be  represented  by  earnings  but it is  acknowl~dged that 
1t! 
· application  to  the  real world  would  be  more  app~qpriate if 
non-pecuniary attributes were  also  included. 
'  ;  ~ 
The  profiles,  either for  earnings  or for  e~#loyment, 
:  .·\ 
have  in  general social rather than  economic  ori9~ns. 
Education  and  pure  ambition  provide  methods  of  ~~eaking away 
but,  in  each  case,  the  new  avenues  opened  up  ar~~simply 
I 
alternative profiles:  there  are limitations  to  ~~e earnings/ 
1 
I 
employment  profiles attached  to  the  various  educ~tional out-
J 
lets and  pure  ambition  frequently  necessitates ·~}period of 
'  self-employment.  The  one  sense,  however,  in  whibh  the  profiles 
',  :1 
are  conditioned  or  even  generated  by  economic  r.a}her  than, 
social factors  is ·through  the  provision,  within·.·~  firm  or 
enterprise,  of  formal  promotional  or career  pro~;ession 
ladders.  Al  t~ough these  too  may  have  social ori.gins,  they 
are  generally defined  in  broad  terms  by  employer~ and  offered 
I 
to  the  employee  as  a  profile segment.  This  doe~ not  deny  the 
role of trade  unions  in  establishing  these  1 inte.rnal labour 
'  f 
'. 
market  structures'  nor  the possibility of  indivi~uals leaving 
at any  stageo  But  the  important  feature is  the~ they  may 
alter at different  times  and  for  different  reasons  to  the 
profiles  on  entry which  are  more  completely  conditioned  by 
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social origins.  In  particular,  their creation or destruction 
may  be  initiated by  the  competitive  pr~ssures on  the  employer 
in  the  product  market. 
Collective action  by  employees,  taking  the  form  of  an 
industrial dispute,  is  a  well-known  expression  of conflict. 
Militant action of this  kind  is based  on  the  community  of 
interest for  the  two  sides,  but  with  particular emphasis  on 
the  employees  cohesion.  What  we  have  suggested  above  is the 
concept  of  voluntary mobility  seen  as  an  individual rather 
than  collective  exp~ession of militancy.  Such  action is 
taken  when  collective action fails,  either because it was 
ineffective against  employers  resistance  or  because  there 
is no  community  of interest between  a  particular employee 
and  the  remainder  of  the workforce. 
Voluntary mobility is limited  by  aspirations  and  these 
limitations are reinforced  by  restricted access  to  information 
about  vacancies.  Voluntary  job search  by  the  already  employed 
is a  function  of  the  incentive,  given  by  the  deviation  of 
real wages  from  an  aspiration level,  and  the  opportunity, 
given  by  access  to  information.  There  is clearly a  difficult 
aggregation  problem  here  since it is not  obvious  what  the 
average  profile would  look  like,  what  the  average  access  to 
information is,  and  indeed  whether  average  behaviour is of 
much  use  in  this context.  Some  operational value  can  be 
given  to  these  ideas  in  the  following  way.  Let  Q be  voluntary 
quitting,  W.  the  wage  in industry i, ~.  the ·variance of wage 
~  1 
levels across  firms  in  industry i, W the  overall average  wage 
(across industries  between  which  there are  significant mobility 
flows  or across all industries),  and  V.  the  number  of vacancies 
1 •  P4  -
in industry i.  Then  we  can  write  the  number  of voluntary 
quits  generated  in industry  i  as: 
v.) 
~ 
with  f 
1 
(Wi/  ..  W)  > 0,  f  I  (0'".) <  0,  f 
1 
(V.)  '>  01• 
l.  l. 
The  cohort  career-progressional element is captured  by  the 
average  age  of  employee  (a.)  but  with  no  clear presumption 
l. 
I 
on  the sign  of  f  (a.)  except  that it is probably  negativ~ 
l. 
for  low  values  of ai.  In  each  case,  a  voluntary quit 
generates  an  applicant  for  a  vacancy  so  long  as  he  remains 
in the  labour force. 
Job  search  by  the  unemployed  (registered  or unregistered) 
is assumed  to  be  automatic  for  males  but will depend  on .the 
view  taken  of labour  supply factors  for marginal labour  force 
participants:  for  example,  the  earnings  profile may  no  longer 
be  attached  to  the  individual  but  to  the  household.  For  any 
I 
group  of job searchers,  the  unemployed  may  attempt  to  regain 
the  earnings  profile they  were  on  prior to  beco~ing unemployed 
or they  may  adopt  (voluntarily or involuntarily)  a  new  profile. 
Clearly for  some  groups,  such  as  unskilled  labour in  depressed 
areas  and  married  women,  the  original  (life cycle)  earnings 
or  employment  profiles may  include anticipated spells of  un-
employment  whilst  for  others it will not. 
The  applicants for  jobs  from  among  the  unemployed  are 
generated  by  vacancies  but,  since  search  eliminates  part of 
1.  At  this stage of development  of the model,  it is easier 
to  conceive  of the level of voluntary  quits in  each  segment 
(primary or secondary)  rather than  in  each  industry. 
I 
I 
>!!' 
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the  stock  of vacancies  for  any  individual,  the  number  of 
applicants  per  unemployed  person  is a  decreasing  function 
of the  duration  of unemployment.  Hence  we  can  write: 
~  =  g(V,  d) 
u 
I  I  A 
with  g  {V)  >  O,  g  {d)  <  0  where.~ is  number  of 
u 
applicants  per  unemployed,  V is total vacancies  and  d  is 
I  ~ 
the  average  duration  of  unemployment.  Note  that  g  (V)  <  f  (V) 
because  of  greater restrictions  on  the access  to  vacancies 
for the  unemployed. 
The  remaining  group  of potential applicants  are  new 
entrants to  the  labour force.  These  comprise  young  people 
{specifically,  the  output  of the  education  system at all 
stages),  married  women  and  immigrants.  The  bulk  of  these 
will  be  applicants in  the  secondary labour market,  with  only 
a  limited  number  of  those  who  have  left education  having 
aspirations  to  primary  sector jobs,  through  training 
programmes  and  other formal  entrance  channels  established 
with  the  education  system.  Entry  to  the  labour force  is 
presumed  to  be  signalled  by  an  application  and  hence  the 
' 
only  question is to  define  the  volume  of  new  entry.  Whilst 
the  entry  from  the  education  system  can  be  taken  as  more  or 
less  demographically  determined1,  labour force  participation 
by  married  women  is only  partly demographically  determined 
and  immigration  mostly  not  so.  Participation  by  married 
women  has  been  the  subject of many  studies  and  the  weight  of 
1.  although  decisions  to  remain  in full-time  education may 
depend  on  the  current state of the  labour market. - 96  -
the  evidence  favours  a  household  decision  model,  dependent 
on  the  level of real wages,  relative  pay  of  women  and  the 
availability of suitable  jobs,  complemented  by  certain demo-\ 
graphic  factors  such  as  family  size and  number  of children 
in different  age  ranges  (pre-school,  school  age  etc.). 
lmmigration  from  the  Commonwealth  into the  U.K.  has  been 
politically controlled since  the  Commonwealth  Immigration 
Acts  of 1962  and  1968:  but  other immigration,  particularly 
from  the  Irish Republic,  has  been  relatively free.  Studies  · 
of these  net migrant  flows  have  shown  a  dependence  on 
relative earnings levels  and  relative activity levels  (as 
proxied  by  unemployment  rates).  In  summary,  therefore,  w~ 
can write: 
N =  XE  +  h  (W,  Wf/w  ,  V) 
m 
where  N =new entry,  XE  =entry from  education,  W =real wage1, 
Wf/w  =  the  female/male  relativity for  wages  and  V = total 
m 
vacancies.  The  derivatives of the  function  h  are,  respectively, 
negative,  positive  and  positive. 
(iii) aggregation  and  collective action: 
The  model  so  far described  has  included  a  number  of 
references  to  collective action,  both  among  employers  and 
employees.  The  institutional forms  are  employers  organisations 
and  the  trade  union  movement,  with  recognition  of the fact 
that these  have  spatial and  hierarchical subgroups.  Employers 
organisation has  in  general  one  of  two  origins:  either it has 
1.  It is probably  appropriate,  given  a  household  decision, 
that this  be  the  real wage  for adult men. 
f 
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evolved  from  a  trade association,  concerned  primarily with 
events  in  the  product  market  and  the  nature  and  level of 
competition,  or it has  become  established  perhaps  as  a 
response  to  or simultaneously with  the  emergence  of  trade 
union  organisation as  a  counterbalance in  the  area  of 
industrial relations with  emphasis  on  the  formal  employer-
employee  relationships.  Neither of  these  groupings  replaces 
the less  formal  links  of cartelisation of markets  or  company 
bargaining.  But  the  effectiveness of  the  organisation  among 
employers  depends  markedly  on  the  intensity and  nature  of 
competition.  A trade  association  defending  against  external 
competition  can  be  highly  effective  (e.g.  the  British Textile 
Association)  or an  employers  association  can  cope  with  the 
unit cost implications  of collective bargaining across.the 
breadth  of its industry  (e.g.  the  Engineering  Employers 
Federation).  But  trade associations  cannot  cope  with  certain 
labour market  phenomenon  (e.g.  the  re-emergence  of sweat-shops 
in  Clothing)  nor  can  employers  associations  necessarily  cope 
with  external competition  (e.g.  the  fragmentation  of the 
Cutlery industry). 
What  we  have  des~ribed in  the  above  and  in  the  previous 
sections is a  ~ide range  of alternative actions  which  are  in 
principle  open  to  employers,  enabling  them  to  lower their 
unit costs  in  the  face  of  competition  or to  lower  the  costs 
of adjustment  by  internalising their labour costs.  Trade 
unionism  is in part  a  response  to  the social inequity or 
deprivation  which  may  result  from  these actions  and  collective 
bargaining,  represented  through  trade  unions,  leads  to 
restrictions  on  the  options  open  to  employers.  There  is of - 9S  -
course  a  strong  development  of social action  in  trade  unionism 
which  is more  positive  than  represented  above  and  which  in 
turn leads  to  new  conflicts,  possibly totally unrelated  to 
the  current  economic  environment  or market  pressures  on 
employers:  nevertheless  the  primary  source  of restriction  on 
employers  options  has  the  more  defensive origin. 
Collective  bargaining,  particularly on  wages,  lea~to 
the  growth  of national  bargaining in  the  interwar period,  the 
emergence  of local and  company  bargaining  in  the  1950s  and 
1960s,  and  a  resurgence  of nationally  formed  agreements  in 
the  weaker  economic  environment  of  the  1970s.  In  general, 
the  responses  have  been  such  as  to  protect  real wages  against 
terms  of  trade shifts or  general  recession  or  to  share  the 
spoils of increases  in  real national  income.  But,  since 
collective action is neither feasible  nor  desirable  to all 
relevant  employees  for  certain  groups  in  the  labour force1, 
the  employer  may  still achieve  lower  unit costs  through 
changing  the  composition  of their workforce:  this will  be  a 
viable  option  so  long  as  productivity is less widely  dispersed 
than  associated  earnings levels. 
In  aggregate,  however,  we  can  make  rather little use  of 
these  ideas •.  We  cannot  argue,  for  example,  that highly 
organised  industries are  more  or less susceptible  to  dis-
ruption without  more  detailed  study  nor  that unit  labour 
costs  bear  a  direct relationship  to  collective bargaining. 
However,  the  emergence  of  foreign  competition is likely to 
have  a  disproportionate  effect  on  the  mass  production  sector 
1.  such  as immigrants,  who  might  otherwise  have  no  job. 
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of industry  and  a  higher  degree  of unionisation  should 
eliminate  certain  employer  options.  Thus  we  would  expect 
faster  import  penetration  to  lower  average  productivity 
levels,  shift production  towards  the  secondary sector firms 
(proportionately)  and  increase  the flexibility of unit costs, 
and  more  trade  union  organisation should  lower  the flexibility 
of unit labour costs. 
In  terms  of the  formulation  given  on  page  90  above,  we 
can  add  the  two  following  expressions: 
,...  " 
Y;Y  = h  (Yw'  uc/ucF) 
where  TU  = trade  union 
I 
density  and  5  >  0; 
y  =  w  world  trade or market,  UCF  =  foreign  unit labour 
costs  denoted  in  a  common  currency,  and  h  '<v  >  >  o,  w 
It would  be  possible  to  replace  UC/ucF  by  an  ex  post  measure 
such  as  th~ level of import  penetration of the  home  market:· 
'  M = Mf(y  _  X +  M)•  This  leaves  peripheral production  (Y  ) 
to  be  determined  as  a  residual,  given total production. 
However,  it is possible that  Y 
I 
may  be  at least partly deter-
mined  by  its ability to  achieve  low  enough  unit costs  to 
maintain  production. 
(iv)  the  model  and its closure: 
In  order to  close the model,  we  need  the  following 
relationships: ...  1QQ  ... 
A = total applicants  =  A  +  ~Q. +  N 
X  l. 
""  " 
A  A 
E  = I  - F  +  E  -1 
I  I  I  I 
E  = I  - F  +  E  -1 
L = labour  force  = L_1  +  N - X 
U =  u~employment =  L  - E 
These  are all identities.  In  addition,  we  have·to  specify 
the  relationship  between  actual  and  desired  inflow  (I  and  I*) 
for  each  segment.  This  we  do  in  the  following  way: 
1\ 
Let  P = probability of filling  a  vacancy  in  the  primary  sector. 
"  ,.. 
Then  P  =  6  (  ~  1  Ax  +  Q  +  o<2  XE) 
,.. 
such  that  0  -E=  P  .:s;;  1 • 
,. 
VI 
Denoting  the  exponent  of  ~ as  x  and  noting  that  0  ~ ~  ~  oe  , 
"  ,..  we  can  write ln  (1  - P)  =  -x. 
rX  1,  o< 2  are  such  that olk  = f(Wk/Q)  where  Wk  =  average  wage 
I 
of the  labour  force  group  k  and  f  >  o. 
"'  ln  (1  - P
1
)  =-(A- VI  x)/VI' 
Then  we  can write: 
"  "  ~  I  =  P  I* 
I  I  I 
I  =  P  I  * 
The  full model  is  given  in  Table  1a  and  Table  1b  contains 
a  complete  glo~sary of  the  variables  used  in table 1a.  The 
model  contains  a  large  number  of equations,  of which  many  are 
identities,  and  some  non-linearities.  Nevertheless,  it is in 
principal tractable with  one  major  exception.  The  simple 
function  for  the  desired level of  employment  is  no  longer  an 
easily derived  relation,  depending  on  a  cost minimisation. 
This  section of the  model  is not  fully defined  since  employers 
desired  employment  levels are  permitted  to  depend  on  the 
I 
I 
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Table  la:  The  model 
In  the  following,  a  superscript  (A)  refers  to  the  primary 
( I)  h  sector and  a  superscript  refers  to  t  e  secondary sector. 
uc  =  ( LEk  Wk )/(2  Ek  Hk  Pk) } 
k  k  for  primary  and 
pk  = c 2  -rv  I  secondary sectors  e  -kv  v 
" 
1\ 
y  =  h  (Y  ,  UCfucF)  w 
I  "'  y  = y  - y 
,.  ,...  ....  ~  "  " 
,... 
E*  E  -1  = f  (Y  Y_1)  s.t. min  uc  uc_
1  +  c  (  I' R) 
I 
f  ( y')  uc'  E*  =  s.t. min  ,. 
E/E  = 5  (TU) 
1\  , 
E = E  +  E 
"'  " 
/1.  1\. 
F  = Q +  R  +  X 
r' 
I  I  I 
= Q +  R  +  X 
" 
~  L  E* 
,...  A  rJ  I*  = VI  = max  (E 
-1  F)' 
. , 
I 
[  E* 
I  I  r'>, )'']  I  *  =  VI  =  max  - (E_1 
" 
min [ E*  -
,.. 
"  ~J  R  =  ( E_1  - F), 
min (  E* ' 
I  - r'>, 1']  R  =  - (E_1  ,.  "  1\  " 
1\  ,. 
Q =  f  (a·,  wiw'  b"  ,  VI) 
I 
(a 
I  I  I  VI')  Q  =  f  , wrw,  {;'*  , 
~= 
g  (V,  d) 
u 
-
N = XE  +  h  (W,  Wf/  '  V) 
Wm 
,.  I 
v =  VI  +  VI - 102  -
Table  la cont. 
,, 
A = A  +  Q.  +  Q  +  N 
X  ,..  "  ln  ( 1 - p)  =  (''1Ax  +  Q + K2xE  )  I 
I 
VI 
I .  ~ 
I 
1\ 
- D>) 
! 
ln  (1  - p)  =- (A  +  VI 1ln  '1  I 
VI' 
,...  ,.  1\ 
I  = P  I* 
I  '  I  = p  I  * 
o(k  = f  <wk;w>  for  k = 1,  2. 
A.  " 
'I\  1\. 
E =  I  - F  +  E_1 
I 
I  '  - F'  E'  E  =  +  -1 
L =  L_1  +  N - X 
u =  L - E 
I . 
' . 
' . ..  1tl3  -
Table  lb:  A glossarY  of  the  variables 
I 
UC  = unit labour costs 
E  =  employment  (superscript  (*) 
represents desired 
demands 
H = average  hours  worked 
p  =  productivity per man  hour . 
= investment  in machinery of  -v  vintage  v 
r  = discount  rate 
subscript  k  refers 
to  job classification 
Superscript  (A)  refers  to  primary sector and  (')  to 
secondary sector variables. 
Y = domestic  production 
Yw  =·total world  market 
UCF  =  foreign  unit  labour costs,  denoted  in  common  currency 
TU  = trade  union  density 
F  =  outflow 
Q  =  voluntary quits into the  labour market 
R  =  redundancies 
X = demographic  or voluntary departure  from  the 
labour  force 
I*  = desired  inflow 
VI  = vacancies  offered 
0 = co-existent vacancies  and  redundancies 
a  = average  age  of  employee 
W = real wage  of  employee  (W  refers  to  the  whole  economy) 
~  =  dispersion  of wage  distribution 
I 
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d = average  duration  of  unemployment 
Ax  = unemployed  applicants  for  vacancies 
N =  total new  entry into  the  labour force 
XE  =  entry  from  full-time  education 
wf,  wm  = female,  male  real wages 
p  = probability of filling a  vacancy 
L = total labour force 
u = unemployment ~. 
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composition  of  employment,  a  choice  which  will  be  affected 
by  the  level and  distribution of wages,  productivity per man 
hour  and  average  hours  worked.  There  would  be  no  difficulty 
in making  average  hours  and  wages  endogenous:  certainly, 
bearing  in  mind  the  possibility of collective action,  on 
either side,  there  should  be  some  simultaneity. 
In  respect  of the  composition  of  employment,  the  model 
is not  fully specified.  While  the  productivity  per man  hour 
may  be  treated as  either exogenous  or  (as  specified)  dependent· 
on  investment  in  plant  and  machinery,  the  choice of labour 
composition  should  be  endogenous  and  could  depend  on  the 
supply  of labour:  that is,  voluntary quits,  the  unemployed, 
new  entry  and  redundancies all have  career  progressive  earnings 
profiles which  could  be  used  to  give  some  idea  of the  supplies 
of labour at various  wages.  However,  as  discussed  in  the 
main  text,  the  notion of  a  supply  price of  labour is not  a 
clear cut  one  and  hence  the  concept  of a  reservation  wage 
(as  defined  in  job  search  theory)  cannot  be  applied  as  an 
ex  ante  concept  but  only  as  an  ex  post  one.  In  this  sene~, 
there  must  be  simultaneity in  employment  and  wage  policy, 
both  for  employer  and  employee. 
Although  ~o attempt  is made  here  to  solve  the  mod~l 
analytically,  some  observations  can  be  made  about  what 
variables  might  affect the ·relationship  between  actual 
employment  and  output  and  how  this might  appear.  Unit  labour 
costs  determine  competitiveness  and,  in  the  primary  sectors, 
determines  the  performance  in world  or  domestic  markets. 
Thus  improvements  in  competitiveness  should  increase  the 
dominance  of the  primary sector and  reduce  the elasticity - 106  -
of  employment  with  respect  to  output  in  the  short  period. 
Accelerating  wage  claims  would  of  course  reduce  competitiveness 
and  switch  the  demand  for labour  towards  the  secondary  sector. 
It would  also increase the  flows  of labour  in  the  labour market 
(relative  to  net  new  job  creation)  and  thus  lead  to  greater 
flexibility of unit  labour costs with  less frictional adjust-
ment  difficulties,  that is a  higher  probability of filling 
vacancies1•  But  this necessarily  depends  on  the  absence  of 
fixed  supply  prices  for  individual  employees:  the  notion  o~ 
career profiles  generates aspiraticnal or militant mobility 
but is overridden  (ex  post)  by  the  need  to  maintain  a  place 
in  the  employment  hierarchy. 
There  is,  however,  no  clear presumption  that higher 
wages  would  depress  employment  for  any  given  level of output. 
In  fact,  for  a  given  level of output,  higher wages  relative 
to  competition  may  shift production  away  from  the  primary 
sector towards  the  secondary sector where  productivity is 
lower  and  hence  employment  per unit of output  higher. 
Higher  wages,  if they  lead  to loss  of competitiveness,  are 
associated with  smaller markets,  but that  element is already 
captured  in  the  level of total output  (Y). 
Increased mobility,  for  exogenous  reasons,  in either 
sector should  lead  to  a  rise in  the elasticity of  employment 
with  respect  to  output.  But  there is a  potentially strong 
multiplier effect operating  between  quits  and  vacancies. 
A rise in  voluntary  quits  would  generate  more  vacancies  and 
1.  One  offsetting factor  here  would  operate  through  the 
ability through  trade  unions  (or  through  other forms  of 
collective action)  to  impose  p~imary conditions of 
employment. 
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hence  again  increase  voluntary quits,  and  possibly also  new 
entry.  At  the  same  time,  especially if there is no  effect 
on  new  entry,  the  probability of filling  a  vacancy  declines 
so  that actual recruitment  lags  behind  desired  recruitment 
and  an  increasing  proportion of desired  moves  are unsatisfied. 
This  process,  therefore,  slows  down  the  adjustment  of actual 
employment  to ita desired level for  any  given  level or  change 
of total output:  there is reason  to  introduce  turnover  data 
(at least,  abnormal  movements  in  turnover)  as  an  additional· 
variable in  the  relationship  between  employment  and  output. 
15.  Conclusions 
The  failure  of  the  conventional model  lies in its unsuit-
ability for  encompassing  the  possibility of  changes  in  the 
elasticity of  employment  with  respect  to output  and  distinguishing 
this  from  changes  in  the  speed  of adjustment.  When  employer 
behaviour,  and  particularly the  implications  of cost-minimising 
behaviour,  are  thought  through,  the  whole  question  of the. 
competitive  nature of  the  labour market  is called into  question 
and it becomes  necessary  to  incorporate  labour market  segment-
ation  theory. 
The  purpose  of the  paper  has  been  to  draw  attention  to 
the  proposition that  cost-minimisation  may  be  derived  either 
from  the  efficiency motive  or  from  an  ability to  exploit. 
The~roajor variable,  and  the  mo~t complex  to  understand,  in 
the  model  is unit  labour cost:  in  the  product  market, 
competitive  advantage  affords  a  degree  of market  control 
whereas,  in  the  labour market,  competitive  advantage  can  be 
l . 
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achieved  by  retaining control of  uni·t  production  costs. 
Because  of competitive  gains  and  losses,  there are shifts 
of production  between  sectors  which  leads  to  a  reallocation 
of the  demand  for  employees  between  the  groups  in  the  labour 
force.  Adding  to  the  model  a  series of·relationships for  the 
flows  b~ings out  the  dynamic  properties of  adjustment  to  these 
changes  and  also  demonstrates  the  impact  of  exogenous  changes 
in  voluntary mobility  and  demographic  changes  in  the  pattern 
of  new  entry.  The  introduction of career-progressive  or 
truncated  earnings/employment  profiles  provides  some  explanation 
for  voluntary mobility  in  terms  of individual aspirations  and 
an  expression of individual militant action.  Collective  action 
by  employer  organisation  or trade  unions  can  consolidate or 
even  initiate advantages  within  the  product  or labour markets. 
But  perhaps  the  most  important  element  of the  argument 
is the  proposition  that there exist  groups  in the labour  force 
who  are  in  work  with  different rates of  pay,  and  prepared  to 
remain  in work  at those  rates of  pay1,  for  whom  productivity 
differentials are  comparatively  narrow.  On  this basis,  ~t is 
possible  to  have  core  and  peripheral production units·in  the 
same  produ~t markets,  although  possibly in different labour 
markets,  who  ~re competitive or  complementary.  The  coexistence 
is achieved  by  the fact  that differential wages  compensate 
for  technological differences  and  that  the  burden  of  demand 
variation is more  easily passed  on  to  the  factors  of  production 
in peripheral units. 
The  model  remains  incomplete,  since certain elements  of 
1.  This  of  course  i~ not  the  same  as  imputing  a  supply  price 
to  different  groups  of labour. - 1Q9  -
behaviour  (particularly cost-minimisation)  need  further  study, 
and it is not  easily tractable.  Nevertheless,  it is possible 
to  draw  some  inferences  about  the  aggregate  relationship 
between  employment  and  output  from  the  model.  We  begin  with 
a  conventional  model  in which  changes  in  desired  employment 
respond  to  changes  in  output  and  actual  employment  levels adjust 
towards  desired  employment  levels:  the  two  key  parameters  are 
the  elasticity of  employment  to  output  and  the  rate of adjust-
ment. 
The  two  new  factors  to  be  introduced  are  competitive 
advantage  in  the  product  market  and  labour  turnover rates. 
Competitive  advantage  may  be  measured  in  one  of  two  ways: 
firstly,  to  reflect the  advantage  in international markets 
(or  the  emergence  of  import  penetration in  the  domestic  marke.t), 
we  can  measure  the  relative unit  costs of  domestic  against 
foreign  producers,  and,  secondly,  we  can  measure  the  unit 
labour costs  ~f the  largest firms  relative to  the  average 
(using  Census  of  Production  data)  to  reflect domestic  market 
dominance.  In  the  second  case,  we  also  need  a  measure,  such 
as  the  share  of  employment  in  the  competitive  firms,  to 
reflect the  importance  of  primary  employment  conditions. 
The  hypothesi~ is that the  greater is the  competitive  advantage 
the  more  widespread  are  primary  conditions  of  employment  and 
the  lower  the  response  of  employment  to  output  change. 
Labour  turnover,  particularly voluntary mobility  (which 
cannot  be  measured  separately),  which  is not  stimulated 
directly  by  changes  in  the  pattern  of desired  employment,_ 
is expected  to  raise initially the  response  of  employment 
to  output  change  but,  through  the multiplier effect on 
I· 
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vacancies,  to  increase the  gap  between  actual  and  desired 
recruitment,  slowing  down  the  adjustment  of actual to  desired 
employment.  We  have  measures  of total turnover  (engagements 
and  discharges)  in manufacturing  but  not  for  the  whole  economy. 
To  cover all sectors,  the  only  information  available  (and  that 
only  for  the  1970s)  is the  proportion  of  employees  with  their 
employer  for less  than  12  months  from  the  New  Earnings  Survey. 
It is finally  worth  considering whether  there is any 
evidence  to  suggest  that  these  hypotheses  might  work.  Durin~ 
the  late 1960s,  the  period  normally  referred  to  as  the  period 
of labour  'shake-out•  or  'dishoarding',  empirical  evidence 
showed  that  the elasticity of  employment  responses  rose  but 
the  speed  of adjustment  slowed  down.  At  the  same  time,  the 
evidence  points  to  unusually  high  labour turnover.  The  1970s 
have  been  characterised  by  low  levels  cif  labour turnover, 
almost  certainly  a  reduction  in  voluntary mobility as  a 
result of  increased  redundancies  and  an  awareness  of  redundancy 
pay  as  well  as  fewer  employment  opportunities,  and  by  acceler-
ating  import  penetration,  especially in markets  for  finish~d 
manufactures.  The  high  import  penetration  should  raise the 
response  of  employment  to  output  change  at  the  margin,  but 
be  accompanied.by  a  shift towards  lower  productivity levels: 
the  lower  turnover  levels should  reduce  the  response  of 
employment  to  output  but  increase  the  speed.  The  evidence 
points  towards  a  decline  in  the  response  in  the  early 1970s 
and  to  a  slowing  down  in  the  average  productivity trend. 
This  paper  has  been  intended  to  set out  some  ideas  to 
improve  our  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  employ-
ment  and  output  change.  Some  suggestions  have  been  made 
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which  a  priori may  find  some  empirical support.  But  two 
substantial  gaps  remain  in the analysis.  firstly,  the  model 
needs  more  development  and  to  be  taken  to  the  point at which 
analytical solutions  can  be  obtained  and  reduced  forms, 
compatible  with  available data,  derived.  Second,  the  whole 
area  of  the  role of management,  as  opposed  to  the  unitary 
concept  of  employer organisation,.needs to  be  introduced  to 
complete  the  explanation of  primary  sector behaviour  and  the 
transmission  of motives  into  behaviour.  It is easy  enough 
to  place  product  markets  in  a  fundamental  role  operating  on 
employers  who  are  then  opposed· by  trade  union  organisation 
or  employee  resistance;  it is much  more  difficult to 
incorporate  the  interplay between  management  and  workforce, 
where  the  forces  operating cannot  be  modelled  in the uni-
directional manner. 
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